

THE RELIGIOUS POSITION OF THE MUSLIM CULTURAL COMMUNITY IN THE PHILIPPINES¹

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Dr. Stuart Schlegel in a paper, "Muslim-Christian Conflict in the Philippine South", written in early 1974, pointed out that Filipino Muslims live in a quite different world from that of the Filipino Christians. Filipino Christians and Muslims are each oriented toward a different wider community from which they draw their religion, culture, law, values and view of history.² The Filipino Christians owe much to the West — to Spain who brought the Roman Catholic faith and many influences in language, music, art, law, etc.; and to America who brought her English language, democratic institutions, and, perhaps less happily, her "Hollywood" life-style. But the Muslims of the southern Philippines have maintained their roots more firmly in the Malay World, and owe much to the Islamic civilization of Arabia and the Middle East. One cannot study the histories of the Mindanao and Sulu sultanates without discovering the dynastic, political and trade relationships which for centuries existed between them and the rest of the Malay World and the larger Islamic World beyond. One cannot travel in the Muslim areas of the Philippines without noting that the arts and manufactures, music and dances, language and literature, dress and life-ways are similar, if not practically identical, to those of the neighboring peoples of Malaysia and Indonesia. Nor can one stay long in the southern Philippines without being aware that a great deal of commerce and communication — legal and otherwise — is still carried on between the Muslim inhabitants and their kinsmen and partners across international lines. Indeed, those lines were drawn by Spanish and American, Dutch and English colonial powers and had the effect

of imposing Philippine nationality on people who were, and are, integral to the Malay World.

Like so many other developing nations in modern times, the Philippines has been preoccupied since World War II with problems of economic, scientific and educational development; international trade; foreign relations; and constitutional and political issues. Meanwhile, Filipino Muslims have been growing more firmly fixed in their Islamic consciousness. They have constructed many new mosques, established many new religious schools, organized many new Islamic societies and associations, sent many more of their number on the *haji* to Mecca and welcomed expanded contacts with fellow Muslims in many lands. Government efforts to attract Filipino Muslim attention away from the Malay and Islamic worlds and to "integrate" them into the modern Philippine national system have fallen short of success partly because of this deepening Islamic consciousness.

This consciousness can be described, and should be understood in terms of three elements: psychological identity, the Islamic ideal of *umma* and the concept of *dar-al-Islam*. Insofar as these define the *religious* position of the Muslims in the Philippines from their own point of view. It is my thesis that these elements *are* important parts of the conscious and subconscious mind-set of Filipino Muslims.

Psychological identity

Ordinary Filipino Muslims may not have a very sophisticated knowledge of the classical theology, philosophy and legal formulations of Islam (and in this they resemble their Christian brothers with respect to Christianity!), and they may even confuse some pre-Islamic superstitions and customary practices (*adat*) with the essentials of Islam. But most of them do know the basic teachings and duties of their faith. They are aware that their religion sets them apart from all other men, binds them together as a community, and at least ideally, governs all aspects of their lives. Moreover, there is no question about the psychological disposition of ordinary Muslims to be Muslim — and this disposition of ordinary Muslims to be Muslim — and this disposition is, in the final analysis, the only valid criterion (even in Islamic Law) by which their degree of "Muslimness" can be judged. At the same time,

among the Filipino Muslims there are a number of persons who have solid and extensive learning in Islam, and from these persons come those who are recognized as '*Ulama*, that is, religious leaders qualified to make pronouncements on Islamic religious and legal matters affecting the Muslim community.

Islam, provides the Filipino Muslims whatever their doctrinal grasp of it at the very least with a psychologically crucial view of the meaning of their existence. It shields them from the unbearable thought that their individual lives are fleeting and insignificant and links them to a larger and more enduring purpose: the Will of Allah. "Islam" and "Muslim" come from the same Arabic root word meaning "submission" to the Will of Allah). This constitutes a faith-ideology which is vital to their existence and which gives meaning to their lives.

Any threat to this ideology would be intolerable and would represent a kind of "psychological death" which would be harder to contemplate than biological death.⁴ Historically, Filipino Muslims have suffered much "biological death" in many bloody encounters with non-Muslims, defending the independence of their homeland (seen as part of *dar al-Islam*, the "Abode of Islam") and life-ways (understood as sanctioned by the Qur'an and Islamic custom). Unable to prevent the physical conquest of their homeland and its incorporation into the Philippine nation, the Filipino Muslims have nevertheless continued to struggle, in every way open to them, against what they have seen as threats to their psychologically-anchored Islamic identity.

The Moro National Liberation Front in southern Philippines, and the secessionist movement which it now spearheads, are best understood as products of the strong Islamic identification of the Muslim cultural community. Nor do they represent a phenomenon unique to Islam in the Philippines. Among traditionalist-minded Muslims in other parts of the world are many who turn to movements — some of them fanatical — which help them to come to grips with such forces as colonialism, secularism, modernism, communism, and so forth, which threaten their all-embracing faith-ideology.⁵ The Muslim secessionist movement claims that it is seeking independence from a tyrannical, oppressive Filipino Christian "colonialism".

The Umma ideal

From an Islamic viewpoint, the fundamental concern of all such movements is to preserve, or to recover, or to restore as much as possible, the *umma*, the Islamic social community, in which the divinely-ordained faith-ideology, with its accrued doctrines, customs and laws, may find full expression.

All Muslims belong, by virtue of their being Muslims, to the world-wide, non-territorial *umma* of Islam, no matter where they live.⁶ But many individual Muslims, perhaps even most, seek to be part of an *umma* on the local level. They feel that in order to be *fully* Muslim they must belong to a local community which maintains the essentials of an Islamic social order. The noted Filipino scholar, Cesar Adib Majul, underscored this question:

The fundamental question now facing individual Muslims in the Philippines is whether they still desire to have or preserve a Muslim community in the country -- a community that will testify to the Oneness of Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad and who will adhere to the fundamentals of Islam. This question is not the same as that as to whether the Muslims want to exist as individuals or not. The question, to be repeated, is whether the Muslims want to preserve their existence as an *ummah*. . . It is inconsistent and not canonically possible for an individual to claim that he can still be a Muslim and not advocate the existence of a Muslim community. . . Moreover, Allah has commanded the believers to act as a community or as a nation. . . It has been clearly demonstrated that no one can be a good Muslim unless he works for the unity and cohesion of the Muslim community as well as its social well-being.⁷

Any understanding of what has been happening among Filipino Muslims in recent years (to say nothing of their activities for the entire incorporation into the Philippine state) is inadequate if it fails to grasp that their activities aim at preserving remaining aspects of *umma*, and recovering, if possible, those aspects of *umma* which they believe they have lost.

Dar al-Islam

In the past, the Muslim region in southern Philippines was clearly *dar al-Islam*, that is, territorially part of the "Abode of Islam". But

its conquest by non-Muslims put that region in an ambiguous position from the standpoint of Islamic law (*Shari'a*). Filipino Muslims, as earlier noted, are members of the spiritual, non-territorial universal *umma* of Islam; those in communities relatively isolated from non-Muslims can achieve *umma* on the local level. But there is a question as to whether their homeland can still be regarded as territorially and juridically part of *dar al-Islam* or be regarded as lost to *dar al-Harb* (the "Abode of War", the territory of non-believers).⁸ This request is important to Muslims because it affects how they see their relationship to the non-Muslim Government under which they live. In the traditionalist view of Islamic law, if a Muslim country were conquered by non-Muslims and the Muslims fight them in every possible way.⁹

Islamic law recognizes that a country which passes into the hands of non-Muslims does not *ipso facto* become *dar al-Harb*. It becomes so when: 1. the legal decisions of unbelievers are regarded and those of Islam are not; 2. the territory in question is not contiguous to a *dar al-Islam* country — in other words, it is completely surrounded by *dar al-Harb*; and 3. no Muslim, or non-Muslim subject of a Muslim state, can live there in the same security as under the previous Muslim government.

Of these conditions, Muslim jurists regard the first as the most important, and some hold that as long as a single legal decision of Islam is observed and maintained, a country once Muslim cannot be said to have become *dar al-Harb*. The more general view is that if any Islamic law is enforced for Muslims, then the country retains its character as *dar al-Islam*. Muslim jurists also generally agree that another test of *dar al-Islam* is whether Muslims can hold their Friday assembly prayers and *Id* observances unmolested.¹⁰

Some Filipino Muslims feel that because their non-Muslim government allows sufficient freedom of religion and makes at least a few provisions for the observance of Islamic customs and laws related to domestic matters, their region is still part of *dar al-Islam*. They are thus inclined to cooperate with the government and their concern is to press peacefully for an expansion of freedom for Islam and/or to protect the Muslims' Islamic interests. There are other Muslims — especially in remote areas who simply do not acknowledge that sovereignty over

their territory ever really passed to non-Muslims. Giving full allegiance to their local leaders, they do not recognize the authority of the Republic of the Philippines, as their forebears refused to recognize that of Spain or America. For them, of course, the question as to whether their region is still part of *dar al-Islam* does not arise. Many more Filipino Muslims feel that the Muslim region is now in an intermediate position between *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-Harb*, and that there is danger of its slipping fully into the latter category. They call this intermediate position *dar al-Aman* (or Darul Aman), the "Abode of Peace", meaning that Islam is, for the sake of peace and safety, protected to some extent by the laws and official policies of the non-Muslims.

It is in the light of *dar-al-Harb* dichotomy that many issues Filipino Muslims raise with the national government should be seen. The Muslims' past and present anxieties over such matters as official recognition of the dignitaries and authority of their traditional leaders (sultans, datus, etc.), the appointment of Muslims to government posts in their own region, the security of their lands from alienation, respect for their religious customs, official cognizance of Islamic and *adat* law (particularly in domestic and inheritance affairs), and so on, should be understood as part of their general concern to preserve, or restore, their homeland as *dar al-Islam*. Or at least as *dar al-Aman*. Although few Filipino Muslims would articulate their situation to non-Muslims, in quite these terms, the fact is, their secession movement springs from their fear that government policies and programs aimed at integration have the effect of turning their homeland into *dar al-Harb*. Moreover, this is the phraseology found in Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Muslim Independence Movement of the Philippines, drawn up by ex-Governor Udtog Matalam of Cotabato and his followers in June 1968:

That it is the duty and obligation of every MUSLIM to wage JIHAD, physically or spiritually, to change DARUL AMAN (present status of the Muslim communities) to DARUL ISLAM (Islamic territory) and prevent it from becoming DARUL HARB (hostile territory to the MUSLIM).¹¹

Towards Compatibility

It is axiomatic in physics that when an irresistible force meets an immovable object, "something's got to give". The Muslim cultural community in the Philippines is in a sense an "immovable object" confronting the seemingly "irresistible force" of Philippine national destiny. Today, as often in the past, their confrontation is violent, and eventually something has simply got to give.

Hopefully the giving in will be on both sides. Filipino Muslims have natural human rights regarding their religion, customs, living space, and economic resources. They are entitled to have these rights respected by their fellow citizens. On the other hand, the Muslims must also understand that for better or worse the forces of history have brought them and their homeland into union with the Philippine state. They belong, like it or not, to the national concept, and the nationalist sentiment of the majority people is unlikely to tolerate secession. History cannot be reversed, and realistically speaking, independence for the Muslim region is not a viable alternative. The Muslim region is regarded as vital to the economic development and the political security of the Philippines. So, then, if the present unhappy state of affairs is not to continue, Filipino Christians and Filipino Muslims are going to have to work harder for compatibility.

In countries where cultural, religious and linguistic minorities have long histories of their own, the cause of compatibility is probably best served if official policies allow, in an openly democratic spirit, cultural and religious pluralism. The 1973 Constitution, newly promulgated but not yet fully implemented, in the Philippines affirms such a spirit.¹² At the same time, government officials would be well advised to recognize that the Muslim cultural community possesses certain legal, educational and social interests for which special accommodation ought to be made, though of course not in such a way as to affirm Muslim solidarity over against the rights and freedoms of other citizens.

Towards Promoting Compatibility: The Christians

From the side of the Filipino Christian majority and the govern-

ment, the *sine qua non* of compatibility would seem to be responding positively to the long standing and deeply felt fears of Filipino Muslims. Sen. Mamintal Tamano, speaking for his fellow Muslims, summarized these fears under four headings:¹³

1. Fear of being alienated from their religion;
2. Fear of being displaced from their ancestral home;
3. Fear of having no future in their country because they really do not participate in its government nor share fully in its economy;
4. Fear of losing cherished values, customs and traditions.

A positive response to these fears would certainly begin with an appreciation of the fact that they are genuine and deserving of serious consideration and action. Elements in positive action would involve at least the following:¹⁴

1. Marshalling the resources of the public and private schools and of the communication media to promote wholesome attitudes in Muslim-Christian relations;
2. Adopting the necessary measures in law — and enforcing them — to protect the lives, properties and traditions of Muslims;
3. Giving serious consideration to proposals for some measure of autonomy, within a federal framework, for the predominantly Muslim areas of the Philippines;
4. Taking remedial steps to correct any imbalance respecting the Muslim share in the national patrimony;
5. Setting the national house in order so that an atmosphere of honesty, efficiency and fairmindedness exists at all levels of the government;
6. Developing — with the full participation of respected Muslim leaders — long-range plans for the Muslim region looking to its economic, social and educational advancement;
7. Establishing and maintaining effective channels of communication between the Muslim peoples and the government at the highest levels.

Of course, much has already been done along these lines in the Philippines. In 1973, a Muslim Advisory Council was established to counsel the President and other high officials on matters affecting

Muslims. Economic upliftment in the Muslim region is being accelerated along with improvements in health and education. Special legal provision has been made in law for the application of parts of the Islamic personal law system for Muslims – and the government is now studying a sophisticated **Proposed Draft of the Administration of Muslim Law Code of 1974**¹⁵ submitted in April 1974 by a special research staff of Muslim lawyers commissioned by the Office of the President. An Institute of Islamic Studies has been established under government auspices in the new Philippine Center for Advanced Studies in the University of the Philippines in Quezon City. The Philippine Amanah Bank has been set up with several branches in the Muslim region, and with heavy capitalization, to meet the needs of Muslims.

Unfortunately these and other such measures, most of which have only recently been undertaken, appear to be motivated more by a desperate desire to bring order to a steadily deteriorating situation than by a genuine respect for, and understanding of, the Muslims' faithful adherence to their religion. The nub of the matter is attitude. Success in helping Muslims to become contented and contributing citizens will, in the long run, depend on a fundamental reconstruction of the presently negative attitude of non-Muslims.

Abundant evidence on the prevalence of this negative attitude exists. A 1973 study of ethnic attitudes in five Philippine cities outside the Muslim region was published by the Social Research Laboratory of the University of the Philippines. In the study under the Rodolfo A. Bulatao's direction, 1,700 respondents were asked to class various Philippine ethnic groups in 14 categories: intelligence, industriousness, friendliness, generosity, progressiveness, peacefulness, cleanliness, etc. Filipino Muslims were rated low in every category except thrift and physical strength – and they were the least favored as employers, neighbors and sons-in-law. In the questionnaire were 26 statements with which respondents were to agree or disagree. The statement which most agreed with was "The Philippines should be proud of being a Catholic country", while there was general disagreement with the statement, 'The Muslims are making an important contribution to national development'. Only 5.5% of respondents felt that the religious rights of Muslims should be recognized as a feature of integration.

“Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn,” writes Bulatao, “is that a gap exists between protestations of national unity, at the level of national or regional leadership, and the attitudes of ordinary people across ethnic boundaries, particularly those that set apart Chinese and Muslims.”¹⁶

The negative attitude of Filipino Christians towards their Muslim co-citizens leaves them ill-disposed to take the Islamic faith of the Muslims seriously. Filipino Christians suspect that Muslims use their religion as an excuse to pursue non-religious interests (land claims, political power, economic gain, etc.). Such a suspicion is justified only in a few instances. The truth is, Filipino Muslims are victims of costly misreading by non-Muslims, of the genuineness of their Islamic consciousness. And the crux of the matter is that in the Muslim view Islamic “religion” covers an infinitely broader range of affairs than just ritual and doctrine. While Filipino Christians contend that the struggle in Mindanao and Sulu has nothing to do with religion and that the Muslims are simply being led astray by their perfidious leaders or by “outlaws” or by “Maoists”, the Filipino Muslims continue to insist that they are engaged in *jihad* in defense of Islam, and that the issues are religious.¹⁷ Compatibility requires Christians to try harder to comprehend the Muslim viewpoint in this regard.

Towards Promoting Compatibility: The Muslims

Filipino Muslims likewise have an obligation to work towards compatibility. Their situation as citizens of the Philippines is not likely to change, and the nation has a right to expect their full participation and cooperation in realizing the goals of nation-building and development. But it is clear that if they are to participate and cooperate more effectively than in the past, they will have to solve some of the the problems special to themselves as Muslims, including fundamental problems of Islamic theology, law and morals.

They will probably find little in Islamic precedent to help them. Instead, they will have to rely largely on the experience of modern-

minded Muslims elsewhere who are facing similar situations, and on their own creative ingenuity, to find solutions, in the light of God's wisdom, which will allow them to rest easy in their conscience as Muslims. Still, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith stated so aptly on the Muslim minority in India:

... all Muslims together are in fact in a comparable situation within mankind. The relative independence of civilizations has in our day died. Each of man's cultures is called upon to evolve a new ingredient: compatibility. The West has perhaps most to learn in this regard, but no civilization is exempt. In the past, civilizations have lived in isolation, juxtaposition, or conflict. Today we must learn to live in collaboration. Islam like the others must prove creative at this point, and perhaps it will learn this in India.¹⁸

Maybe it will learn this, too, in the Philippines.

The hardest task of the Filipino Muslims — and no one can help them in it — is to fully *accept* themselves as citizens of the Philippines, as well as Muslims, and to reconcile the obligations of *both* their Philippine national and Islamic religious loyalties. This will undoubtedly mean revising the belief still held by many that one can be fully Muslim only as a member of a closed society, structured and ordered under Islamic law. There are very few Muslim countries which adhere to such a view nowadays, albeit to the consternation of some of their more traditionalist-minded citizens.

In this connection, it is worthwhile noting that the *Jam'iyatul 'Ulama*, an organization of conservative Muslim religious leaders in India, has offered a theological and juridical basis for its support of Indian nationalism in the Islamic concept of *mu'ahadah* or "mutual contract". The concept derives from the early years of Islamic history in Medina where the Prophet Muhammad devised a civic contract between his Muslim community and the large non-Muslim community in the city. In the view of the *Jam'iyatul 'Ulama*, the Indian Muslim community, through its representatives, forged a mutual contract — *mu'ahadah* — with non-Muslims to establish the Republic of India. That contract is the Indian Constitution. It is therefore the *Islamic* duty of Indian Muslims, says the *Jam'iyatul 'Ulama*, to keep faith with the Constitution and to work out within national life such personal and social aspects of the total Islamic pattern as can be implemented,

and such socioeconomic and administrative aspects as they can democratically persuade the nation to adopt.¹⁹ Michael D. Mastura, a Muslim descendant of Maguindanaoan sultans, said: "One thing is clear: our task today is to align the religious loyalty of the Muslims and the public policy needs of the country."

Above all, they will work for a new climate of confidence and trust between citizens of all faiths.

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The canons of human decency, and the prerequisites of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, require that Filipino citizens, Christians and Muslims, see each other as equal partners in Philippine national development, entitled to their proportionate share in the nation economic patrimony. This will tax all reserves of patience, goodwill and generosity of avowedly good Christians and good Muslims. The alternative is a continuation of the debilitating tensions and conflicts which have for too long pertained in southern Philippines.

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NOTES

1. This essay is a rewriting, with focus on the Philippines, of a longer essay, "Moros and Khaek: The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand" which appeared in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1975* published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

2. Stuart Schlegel, "Muslim-Christian Conflict in the Philippine South" (unpublished paper, 22 pp. mimeographed, 1974), pp. 12-13. Dr. Schlegel teaches anthropology at the University of California, Santa Cruz.

3. I am indebted for this important insight to the distinguished Dutch Islamicist, Christian Snouch Hurgronje. See his *The Achenese*, Vol. II (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1906), p. 280.

4. For a discussion of the concept of "psychological death" by a noted professor of psychiatry, see Jerome D. Frank, "How Nations See Each Other", *War/Peace Report* (New York) 6/6-7 (June-July, 1966), 5. I have discussed in some detail the application of this concept to the situation of the Filipino

Muslims in 'Christians and Moros: The Confrontation of Christianity and Islam in the Philippines', *The South East Asia Journal of Theology* (Singapore) 10/2-3 (October 1968-January 1969), pp. 80-98.

5. Muslim "liberation fronts" are found in many lands. In Thailand, for example, there is the "National Liberation Front of the Patani Republic" whose cause is similar to the Moro National Liberation Front, except that it is directed against a Buddhist majority people. There is the predominantly Muslim Eritrean National Liberation Front in Ethiopia. There is even a "National Liberation Front of East Turkestan" operating in Sinkiang Province, Peoples' Republic of China. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (New York: Mentor Books, 1957), p. 96, for examples of still other movements of Muslims to preserve their identity against threatening forces. The Darul Islam Movement and rebellion in Indonesia (1949-1961) is another illustration. It was a traditionalist Muslim protest against the "secular" concept in Indonesia.

6. For the meaning of *umma*, see the *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, edited by H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 603-604.

7. C. A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines: Past, Present and Future Prospects* (Manila: Converts to Islam Society of the Philippines Inc., 1972), pp. 26-27.

8. See *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-Harb* in *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, pp. 68-69. The two Arabic terms are sometimes rendered in Roman letters as Darul Islam and Darul Harb. Islamic law and tradition divide the world into these two "abodes".

9. Cf. Abdul Rahim, *The principles of Muhammedan Jurisprudence According to the Hanifi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali Schools* (Lahore: Indus Publishers, 1968), p. 396.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 395-397.

11. The full text of the "Constitution and By-Laws" is reproduced in Alunan C. Glang, *Muslim Secession or Integration?* (Quezon City: R. P. Garcia, 1969), pp. 106-110. The Muslim Independence Movement proclaimed in May 1968, has changed its name to Mindanao Independence Movement, signifying the fact that not everybody supporting its cause was Muslim.

12. Article XV, Section 11 of the new Philippine Constitution (1972) declares:

The state shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interest of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies.

13. See his splendid article on "How to Solve the Muslim Problems Without Bullets", *Solidarity* (Manila) VIII/6 (December 1973), pp. 17-18. The article is full of concrete, practical suggestions on resolving the problems of Muslim-Christian relations which Senator Tamano submitted to President Marcos. Some of them have in fact been implemented.

14. Filipino Muslims have time and again submitted suggestions for appropriate action. This list is a summary of what they believed reasonable requests. See the "Seven Directive Principles of the Federation of the Sultans of the 19 Royal House of Mindanao and Sulu" printed on the back cover of the official Program of the Conference on Government Policies and Programs for Muslim Mindanao, held at Mindanao State University, Marawi City, June 4-6, 1974; and the "Manifesto" of the Ansar El Islam issued before the conference in Marawi City May 31, 1974.

15. Manila: Office of the President, 1974. The Proposed Draft runs to 223 printed pages.

16. Rodolfo A. Bulatao, "Ethnic Attitudes in Five Philippine Cities". PSSC Social Science Information (Quezon City) 1/3 Jan. 1974), 8-11, 13. A succinct summary of the findings was published in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (June 24, 1974), p. 32. In an earlier, similar study of ethnic attitudes, two sociologists, a Filipino and an American, surveyed nearly 1,000 students in six Christian colleges in different areas Muslims received an unfavorable score in all categories and from all Christian groups represented among the respondents. See Luis Q. Lacar and Chester L. Hunt, "Attitudes of Filipino Christian College Students Toward Filipino Muslims and Their Implications for National Integration", *Solidarity* (Manila) VII/7 (July, 1972), pp. 3-9.

17. Nur Misuari, chairman, Central Committee of the Moro National Liberation Front, puts it thus: "We must bear in mind at all times that unless we shall be able to win complete national freedom and independence, our future and the future of our national homeland and Islam shall forever remain obscure and uncertain. For it is not and shall never be to the interest of Filipino colonialism to allow us to remain Muslim and to remain in control of what little piece of land our people are still clinging." *Mahardika* (clandestine, mimeographed newspaper of the MNLF) 1/3 (March, 1974), p. 13.

18. Smith, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

19. See Ibid., pp. 285-286.

20. Michael D. Mastura, "The Philippine State and 'Secularized' Muslim Concepts: Aspects and Problems", in *On the Codification of Muslim Customary (Adat) and Quranic Laws: Papers of the 6th annual Seminar on Islam in the Philippines and Asia, September 20-22, 1973* (Davao: Ateneo de Davao College and Mindanao State University, 1974), p. 230.

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