

CHAPTER III

UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT

The *prima facie* evidence supposedly established in this analysis would not bear any sociological significance were it not for the fact that the phenomena of culture-contact are universal to all peoples of all times and places. In this contemporary world which is made "smaller" by the advent of modern science, technology, and transportation, the races of mankind come closer to one another in culture-contact despite their cultural differences. The settings of conquest and colonization in America, Asia, Africa, and among isolated oceanic islands all contain the same phenomena which may be used as additional data for further investigation of this leadership type and process.

The intermingling of races and cultures leads to ideological conflicts resulting even in violent wars which may mean either the annihilation of the weaker group by the more powerful one or a condition of accommodation. When the ideology of one particular group in the culture-contact disintegrates, it becomes engulfed in the social structure of the dominant group. Yet, the latent conflict continues to exist and must be resolved. When the relationship is one of accommodation, societies and individuals develop more or less a peaceful co-existence as a way of life.

Other sociological analysis may explore many more culture-contact areas having the same problem.

The power monopoly by a dominant group endangers the maintenance of peace, as implied in the Philippine case and presumably in other settings. The report in the "Document" and this analysis of the facts suggest that the process of marginal leadership is a means of reaching the goal of maintaining the balance in inter-group life.

During Italy's pre-war colonization, Benito Mussolini once declared before the Muslim Libyans that he was a "Protector of Islam."³³ Despite the disbelief of intellectual Muslims who made wry jokes on Mussolini's pretention, the ill-fated dictator had expressed in thought, if not in deed, an ideal-type process of leadership in bringing about peace between the two groups. If it were a fact that Mussolini, besides his Italian nationalism, had imbibed a fair degree of Libyan sentiment through acculturation, he would have been fittingly playing the "double role" of a protector, hence a heroic marginal leader for both Catholic Italy and Muslim Libya. His leadership would have been to influence a better state of accommodation between the two peoples having ideological differences. From 1912 to the downfall of Italy's power in Africa, there must have been in some smaller or larger social settings situations where Italians and Libyans had assumed the positions of marginal leaders between their groups.

In a way, the Spanish administration was not too radical at the start of the culture-contact and colonization in the Philippines. It had discovered that the ancestors of the present-day Christian Filipinos were organized into barangays, each ruled by a supreme ruler called a *datu*. In order to make the ruler an intermediary between the barangay subjects and the Spanish government, the colonial administration thought of appointing the *datu* as *cabeza de barangay*, a head or chief of his village.³⁴ For a time, the "*datu-cabeza*" who served a complex role was a marginal leader until he and his traditional group lost their positive balance between the old and new patterns as a result of their Christian conversion or assimilation.³⁵ The Spanish value predominated, as indicated by the native leader who discarded his noble title of *datu* in preferences to the Spanish title of *cabeza*.

The culture-contact between Pacific islanders and the English, Spaniards, Germans, Japanese, and Americans offer more concrete evidence on the widespread significance of the concept of "marginal leadership."³⁶ In Polynesia, among the Samoans, the United States administration chose

to preserve and respect rather than destroy the traditional social structure of the islanders. Chieftainship was an important part of the culture pattern of the Samoans. In recognition of this culture pattern, the administration recognized the positions of the *High Chief*, the *High Talking Chief*, and other minor tribal leaders by letting them continue as leaders of a district with responsibility to both their people and the government. This intermediary position cast the chief into the role of marginal leader.

Among the Ponape islanders of Micronesia, the succeeding administrations of the Spaniards, Germans, Japanese, and Americans have more or less governed the islanders through the existing tribal societies. In each district, the *nanmariki* (High "Sacred" Chief), the *naniken* (second chief in rank, some sort of a prime minister), and other lesser chiefs were recognized as district officials serving as intermediaries between the Ponapeans and the government. Obviously, their functions are those of marginal leaders.

These phenomena of leadership may also be found in the settings of the European and African culture-contact. For example, in the British Uganda Protectorate, the ancient political organization of the Baganda people with its "pyramid of power" remained almost undisturbed by the British colonization. The British as a people ruled by a royal family were considerate of the royalty-rule system of their colonies. The Baganda king, not to mention other lower officials, served more or less as a "marginal leader" between his kingdom and the British colonial administration.³⁷ Once a tyrant and an absolute monarch, the king and his kingdom passed through the processes of social change and secularization toward an adjustment to fit with the English democratic pattern. The king's marginal role was a leadership process of social adjustment between the traditional Bagandas and the British ways of life.

However, despite European influence, it is difficult to believe in the existence of a well-balanced marginal role

on the part of the Baganda king whose people, like other African nations, were sharing the widespread nationalistic movement for their ultimate emancipation.³⁸ In a colonial relation such as this, between "nation and nation," where one desired its freedom from the other, a well-balanced marginality tended toward the negative. In some setting, perhaps, within the same culture-contact, say in the case of a small inter-group situation, marginal leadership may be at work.

In his studies on the personality and culture of "cultural hybrids," Stonequist mentioned marginal men who ultimately became "assimilated," perhaps to assume fully accepted roles in dominant societies. These include the Corsican Napoleon of France, the Austrian-Czech Hitler of Germany, the Georgian Stalin of Russia, and the Lithuanian Pilsudki of Poland.³⁹ Biographers may forget that a process is a gradual phenomenon, not an abrupt change. In moving toward ultimate assimilation, there was no vacuum between the two extremes, so that these leaders may have been at one time assuming marginal roles between the dominant and subordinate groups. In a larger or small inter-group social setting, it is perhaps possible for social researchers to look for marginal leaders among what Stonequist termed "racial hybrids" - the Rurasins of India, the Indo-Europeans of Java, the Metis of Brazil, the Part Hawaiians, and others; or among "cultural hybrids" - the Europeanized Africans, the westernized Orientals of India, and the denationalized Europeans.

In the Philippines, the Late President Manuel L. Quezon, a Filipino-Spanish hybrid, was often accused by "pure Filipinos" for allegedly favoring his co-hybrids by selecting mestizo associates for the jobs in Malacañang Palace. But the accusing individuals often forgot that Quezon had more "pure Filipinos" working with him. In truth, Quezon had a double role and acceptance in the seemingly rival groups. In that particular situation, he was a marginal leader. Similarly, former President Sergio Osmeña, a Filipino-Chinese hybrid, used to be accused of the same "pure Filipinos" as a dummy of the Chinese community

because of his "second" Chinese status. In some situations, but not in all, Osmeña could be regarded as a marginal leader. Hence, the concept must be clarified, that a marginal leadership role is situational, that is, a marginal leader is regarded as such in certain specific situations, but not under all circumstances.

This leadership type may be examined in the field of diplomacy. A caution, however, needs to be stated to avoid any presumption which seems to be unrelated to the hypothesis formulated in the previous analysis of specific situations. "Marginal" or "marginality" as the key concept in the analysis is not employed to the extreme as an "ideally absolute."⁴⁰ In other words, if a person is said to be a marginal leader, it seems a fallacy to refer to him as a "fifty-fifty" leader between two interacting societies. The ratios of his loyalty tend to vary quantitatively between the two, although the ratios might be close to the ideal "fifty-fifty." A polygynist mentioned earlier as an example of "double loyalty" behavior who may declare that he loves his two wives equally can be regarded as a braggart for it is humanly impossible to achieve the absolute.

With the "exception" thus mentioned, it is of interest to examine a few cases in diplomatic relations. In one way or another, some governments exploit the utility of the "marginal leadership" role. The Philippine Republic, for example, sends to the United States diplomats having the category of "American educated." Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo, oriented as he is to the American ways, had been accused by contemporary Russian diplomats as the "mouthpiece" of the Americans. Some of his Filipino political rivals invariably call him "pro-American" or an "American puppet." In truth, however, the majority among his countrymen consider him a loyal Filipino with high acceptability to his American associates. In his writings and speeches, he often represented American-Filipino interests which was a manifestation of marginal leadership, the degree of which should not be taken as an "ideally absolute." This suggests the tentative

hypothesis that marginal leadership tends to occur in a situation of international friendship and alliance.

Marginal leadership can also be abstracted from the position of commanders of allied forces. Marshall Ferdinand Foch of France was the commander of the Allied Forces in World War I. In World War II, General Dwight Eisenhower commanded the same Allied Forces in the European theater and General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific arena. There are more of these concrete and specific cases which occurred in military affairs, where the term "marginal generalship" may be applied. This does not mean that after the event a "marginal general" still continues to assume his role. He ceases to be so after the situation terminates.

The general significance of the concept may not end within the bound of cultural and racial contacts. In the relationship between capital and labor, this type of leadership also tends to emerge. A labor foreman with a positive balance of interests and sentiments may serve as the "dove of peace" for the component groups in the total industrial system.⁴¹ In the Philippine setting, the government has, in many instances, appointed to the cabinet prominent and influential labor leaders. The reason is obvious - to neutralize the enmities between labor and capital by appointing persons who are acceptable to both groups. A labor leader who becomes a cabinet member gains a "high class" status, while at the same time retaining his identity with the "low class." Conversely, a multi-millionaire, the former Vice-President Fernando Lopez, was regarded by the majority of labor elements as a "labor leader" in his native Iloilo Province. In truth, his actual role was that of a "labor-capital" marginal leader. It should be noted that the emergence of his leadership was in the situation of labor and capital interrelationship. It was not in the social setting of a Malacañang Palace *asalto* reception, which was exclusive to the elites with whom he was prominently identified.

Dilemmas of the Marginal Leader

It has been demonstrated in the "Document" and in the preceding discussion that social grants in the forms of statuses and the correlated roles from both interacting groups are the factors that determine marginal leadership. They are the dimensions of the leader's acceptance in each society. However, this investigation has not been able to describe any situation where the leader possessed the same kind or degree of status on both sides and thus may be regarded as exhibiting a "perfect" marginal role. Even the late President Quezon, who was both a racial and cultural hybrid, had not strictly enjoyed the same and equal status on both sides in all situations in his marginal role between the "pure Filipinos" and the "mestizos." The former constituted the majority behind his leadership and to them he owed his success more than to the latter. A social status may either be ascribed or achieved. It can decline, be lost, withdrawn, or re-acquired in a social setting. The decline or loss of a status is a punishment by the status-granting group upon the status-bearer for the latter's deviance or non-conformity with the norm to which the former expected him to conform.⁴²

A marginal leader has more statuses than one to lose if he fails to conform with the norms of one or both of the groups. It follows that he will lose his leadership role. For instance, a Moro marginal leader might forfeit his statuses and consequently his integrated role in a number of ways. If he becomes a Christian convert, which is a deviation from the most rigid Islamic norms or mores, he will be disowned by his Muslim co-religionists and will lose his leadership role.⁴³ If he turns out to be no longer an asset, perhaps because of superficial conversion, he will suffer the consequences of being stripped of his acquired social status and leadership role among the Christians. He may retain his legal status as an "officer" if he is an employee of the government but his general social acceptance is lost. Conversely, if a Catholic marginal leader becomes a Muslim, he will suffer ex-communication. If the Moros find him to be an "anti-Moro," his acquired social status will be withdrawn by the Moros who may no

longer follow him, as a leader, with spontaneous acceptance. As an "officer," perhaps, he will still be a leader but will he retain his social acceptability? This supposition on "conversion and assimilation" is a non-existent case among top Christian and Muslim leaders, but it is presented here as a hypothetical case for comparison with the situations in the United States in the majority-minority inter-group relationships.

"The American Case"

Gouldner's and Lewin's studies on leadership among American minorities indicate that in some ethnic groups, there were those who played the roles of "leaders on the periphery." This is identical to the concept in the Philippine leadership situation, except for the tendency of the leader to ultimately "escape" from his original minority affiliation to join the majority. Lewin viewed these "leaders" as being at the periphery of their group and within the orbit of the dominant groups influence. He observed this among Jews, Negroes, and other ethnic minorities.⁴⁴

These leaders tend to be in the upper part of the class structure of the minority groups. They were the more economically and professionally advantaged members of their minority groups. But in their desire to advance their personal interests, through seeking to relate themselves with the dominant group, they tend to pass out from their marginal roles. As a result, according to Lewin, "we find the rather paradoxical phenomena of what might be called 'leaders from the periphery.' Instead of having a group led by people who are proud of the group, who wish to stay in it and promote it, we see minority leaders who are lukewarm toward the group, who may, under this cover of loyalty, be fundamentally eager to leave the group, or who try to use their power outright for acts of negative chauvinism."⁴⁵

Gouldner observed the same situation, saying "Lacking the substance of power in the inter-group

relationship, the formally coopted minority leader is unable to use his status in the inter-group situation to repay obligations which he has incurred during his ascent in the minority group. He is, moreover, unable to satisfy his group's expectation that he will, in the same way, substantially remedy its position. For these reasons, he tends to lose his leadership of the minority group. Simultaneously, he loses much of his function for the dominant group."⁴⁶

The "escape" in the American case can lead the questioning reader to think of the Philippine marginal leader as fiction and the concept as premature, but the situation is different. A Moro minority leader, as his term may be used for a time, usually belongs to the economically and professionally successful class, like his American counterpart. As such, he possesses high acceptance to the majority with just a thin obstruction to his assimilation. It seems to be so. But there is a thick "glassplate" through which he can hardly pass out from his group. Socially and psychologically, his sentiments for the "royal" kinship and his formative islamization from childhood pulls him back to the positive balance between his interest in the larger society and his sentiment in the *agama* group or the whole tribe.⁴⁷ As far as this investigation is concerned, no matter if a Moro leader is modernized or urbanized in Manila, he desires to return to his village to join the "royal-blood" relations called *bangsa* who ascribe to him the noble status of a *datu*. An interesting comparison and contrast may be made with the attitude of a Plainville kinsman.⁴⁸ If a Moro leader dies, it is his customary wish to be buried beside the graves of his relatives in the village cemetery amidst Muslim rites. In other words, the values to him of his native tradition in the kinship group and his modernity in the larger society keep him on the balance. He is neither a rabid nativist nor a radical modernist. He plays the "role of the middle" as the Greeks would say. A full social acceptance in the Moro leader's original group, plus a partial acceptance in the other group constitute a "marginalizing" force upon the role of this "ideal-type" leader.