

THE POLITICS OF BECOMING: THE MINDANAO CONFLICT IN A WORLD-SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

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As has happened so frequently in the past, an ugly little war in the periphery of a distant country has gone all but unnoticed to the media participants of the "global community," or, more accurately, to its "Western" members. Since largescale fighting in Mindanao began soon after the imposition of martial law in the Philippines by President Marcos in the fall of 1972, more than 95,000 Muslim civilians and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) military cadre have been killed.¹ Moreover, a flood of refugees has been created by the fighting, with more than 130,000 fleeing to another country (Malaysia)² and between 500,000 and 1,000,000 seeking refuge in camps within the Philippines.³ Little if anything about this smouldering conflict has surfaced in the American mass media, and even less about the issues involved or about the critically central position that America plays in the conflict. Without the massive military and economic assistance provided by the United States, the Marcos regime would not be able to sustain its war in the south.

Such ignorance of peripheral wars is, of course, selectively produced. During the MNLF/Philippine conflict's time frame, the Western press has given massive attention to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, to China's invasion of Vietnam, to the flood of refugees those conflicts generated, and to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, to name a few. While this impressionistic overview is only that, nonetheless it suggests how the (American) mass media plays up conflicts involving one (or more) communist

nation participants while blacking out knowledge about a war in which the U.S. is covertly involved.

There is nothing particularly perplexing about this selective mass media production of starkly differing knowledge bases upon which the public builds its existential understanding of policy issue. An earlier tension between the American media and government policy (over Vietnam) has melted away, to be replaced with a growing government/media consensus on foreign policy issues based on a revisionist interpretation of the Vietnam war with its justification for a return to a more interventionist stance towards the Third World. Keeping the MNL/Philippine (U.S.) conflict a non-event seems to be a concrete manifestation of this growing consensus.

Despite media obscurantism,⁴ there has been some solid scholarly work published on the roots of the Mindanao conflict, including insightful analyses of differing world views of the Islamic and secular (Christian) communities as well as of the politics and policies of the MNL.⁵ While the writers cited are fully aware of the larger global political economy within which the Mindanao conflict is nested, their particular concerns did not lead them to examine in detail the transnational structures that largely define the overall parameters of the war. I propose to look at these transnational networks in this paper, and to do so within the world-system perspective developed by Immanuel Wallerstein.⁶

The Wallersteinian paradigm is holistic, dialectically developmental, empirically rooted yet value-committed. It asserts the existence of a single world-system based on the capitalist world-economy. Within the world-system there are core states, semi-peripheral states, and (many) peripheral states, all linked in a single system but struggling to advance in (or retain) hierarchical position or to change the system itself. Begun as a regional "world" system in 16th century Europe, the capitalist world economy has spread geographically to become truly global in

scope and to increasingly penetrate areas newly incorporated or heretofore only partially penetrated. The focus of this study falls within this later category since most of Mindanao remained outside of any active capitalist development until well into the 20th century at which time much of the developmental drive came from outside the Philippines,⁷ a condition fully in conformity with the expectations contained in the paradigm.

The world-system perspective posits the continuing global hegemony of the capitalist world-economy, despite its short- and long-term ups and downs, until that global system is replaced by a socialist world-economy *and* world government. As mentioned earlier, within this capitalist world-economy some peripheral states and especially peripheral areas within these states are now beginning to be exposed to a new phase of development as the powerfully wrenching forces of the global political economy impinge on them. None will escape. Even states that have sought to escape by overthrowing capitalism at the national level have been forced to make their peace - - at least for the middle-term run - - with the constraints the world-system imposes on their options. While great benefits typically accrue to the citizens of states that have attempted to "build socialism in one state," individual socialist states have been forced to make critically important compromises to survive in the world-system. Even groups of socialist nations - - as, for example, Comecon - - have as yet failed to build autonomous world political economy institutions and have been increasingly incorporated in the capitalist world-economy.⁸

The war in Mindanao is between forces representing the cutting edge of the expanding capitalist world-economy on the one hand (the Philippine government and its public and private transnational allies) and the MNLF on the other. The MNLF seeks political independence or at a minimum a high degree of political autonomy so that Muslims might protect their Islamic way of life and create a community more completely guided by Islam than is

possible under existing relationships in the Philippines. On the basis of the argument just advanced, a small population such as the Moros⁹ can never expect to escape the capitalist world economy. It could, however, hope to achieve its stated goal of independence or autonomy - - one has only to recall the successful 15-year struggle of Guinea-Bissau against Portugal - - a goal more in keeping with earlier independence movements that left largely unchallenged the basic economic structures of the world system.

The post-World War II movement for nation-state independence, while at the time viewed typically as progressive and unproblematic, generally served to consolidate power in the hands of a small elite usually committed to maintaining existing world-system structures while striving only for a better position within them. Once in command, these elites quite naturally viewed all ethnic demands within the state for redress of old colonial wrongs, for a better share of the government's services, or for "autonomy" as traitorous threats to national security. The post-colonial nation-state has been almost universally accepted as the only proper political community in the world-system. The myriad smaller primordial ethnic communities not so fortunate as to have inherited a state form were consigned to "assimilation," "integration," flight, or fight. Many chose the latter, with the overwhelming majority crushed by the superior forces of the nation-states (typically with generous foreign support). Only in the rare instances does the struggle approach a stalemate (as in Burma) or, even rarer, lead to a successful breakaway state as in the case of Bangladesh.

Only after it had become painfully obvious that the "development" strategies of the typical post-colonial nation-state were not producing the promised benefits for the masses did the conventional "political development" theory come under massive intellectual attack. Part of that attack called into question the conventional wisdom on ethnic communities, a conventional wisdom that viewed their demands as unproblematically parochial, re-

actionary and deserving suppression "for the national good."¹⁰ In light of the argument that ethno-national struggle in peripheral nations can represent, objectively, a progressive force (although not automatically so), it becomes necessary to examine each movement in detail. The MNLF, for example, with its emphasis on national liberation for the Bangsa Moro ("Moro Nation"), seems to give first attention to the conventional "national" ideological component. This is fully in keeping with the historical role of Islam in the 20th century of having produced a great number of the national *independence* movements.¹¹

On the basis, however, of the past 30 years of evidence against the proposition that nation-state independence can produce the mass benefits claimed for it, there is a good prima facie case against settling for "independence" as the goal for ethno-national struggle and for demanding that a national liberation movement give high priority to creating a mobilizing ideology based firmly on mass needs. The main exceptions to this have been precisely in Islamic nations, with the Iranian revolution representing the extreme case. National independence has in some cases come to be viewed as a tool for building a fully Islamic community, hence the attempt by the Iranian Islamic leaders to gain control over the state machine for purposes of enforcing an Islamic way of life throughout the nation. Little concern is voiced for economic development or for satisfying mass needs. As Ayatollah Ruhollah Khoemeini stated, ". . . if Iranians were given a choice between becoming the slaves of Mr. Carter and his likes and reverting to the old standards of living and using the donkey for transportation they would choose the latter in order to maintain their independence."¹²

The centrality of "religion as a way of life" for the Philippine Moros¹³ suggests that the MNLF faces the same pressures, i.e., to combine a national independence ideology primarily with one calling for a defense of the Islamic community rather than

with a program demanding structural changes that would benefit the mass public. While "Islamic socialism" is frequently mentioned as one of the goals for which the MNLF is fighting, official (English language) publications of the Front make almost no mention of this goal, never spell out what "Islamic socialism" might mean, and stress, rather, the need to gain "freedom and independence" without which the "future of our national homeland and Islam shall forever remain obscure and uncertain."¹⁴ One MNLF commander is reported to have said, on the subject of Islamic socialism, that ". . . socialism comes in specifically in the Islamic practices - - not exactly in the economic side. Among Muslims, Islam is a way of life."¹⁵ This can hardly be reassuring to the non-Muslim majority living on the islands claimed as properly part of the Bangsa Moro nation.¹⁶

The lack of attention by the MNLF to what they want the future to provide aside from a more secure home for the working out of an Islamic way of life seems ironic especially since many have noted that it is precisely the government's rather aggressive development policies that continue to exacerbate relationships between the two communities. The Philippine government has a firm commitment to a conventional trickle-down development model - - having a self-conscious *political economy of becoming* - - gives the government a powerful tool in its struggle against the MNLF.

By way of contrast, the MNLF seems nearly totally lacking in any vision of the future that could reach any interests other than those very narrowly defined as Islamic. Its most repeated slogan - - aside from "freedom," "independence," and the "Islamic way of life" - - is "*Victory or to the Graveyard!*" which regularly concludes *Mahardika* material.¹⁷ This lack of a commitment to some *model of becoming* has led one writer to argue that the Muslim community came to "equate modernization with Christianization" and therefore something to be fought against.¹⁸ Another, analy-

zing the positions taken by a non-MNLF Muslim scholar and an equally moderate Christian on "development," concluded that "Filipino Christians and Muslims have rather different understandings of what are the principles, priorities and objectives of development." He summarizes these differences with the phrases "development for manpower" for the Christians, and "development for manhood" for the Muslims.¹⁹ The secular (Christian) development goal is to transform people so that they *become* more productive, so that the nation-state *becomes* powerful - - goals that are highly instrumental to the interests of the dominant class. The MNLF, in contradistinction, seems bent on creating the conditions for *being*, for immediately living in a more complete sense life within Islam.²⁰

The MNLF decision to build its movement around basically nationalist and Islamic-religious goals leaves unspecified what such a future might mean materially for the people of Mindanao. By not defining a development model, the MNLF puts its own people in a highly vulnerable position vis-a-vis the Philippine government. The latter comes fully armed with a highly seductive package of promises of a dynamic, exciting future for the region, and with a sufficiently impressive array of development projects delivered or in the pipeline to make a convincing case that its model "works." This Philippine model is highly appealing, seductive at both the mass and elite levels.²¹ It provides near-cornucopian quantities of material goods with which to lure the elites into cooperation with the regime, and the promise of a future extension to the masses of the same largesse. And since in the late 20th century the lure of a "bourgeois way of life" seems totally global for all elites²² and the utopian goal for all those within reach of the socializing agents of Western consumerism, lack of a clearly articulated alternative development model that can deal with the vitally significant material interests that are legitimately part of planning for the future - - *of becoming* - -

leaves the MNLF crippled.²³ Not only is the movement made vulnerable by this weakness (because of the cooptative advantage it gives the Philippine government), but its appeal to many Muslims is undercut. Without a clear picture of how their skills might be employed to build a better Islamic future, many technically-trained Muslims find the government's plans for the future incontrovertible. Finally, the head of the MNLF - - Nur Misuari - - seems reduced, when talking about the future, to making demands that jobs created in industry and agriculture in the region be filled with Bangsa Moro employees and managers, not with "immigrants." This is an extremely weak position from which to argue a case as vital as the one the MNLF is making since it leaves entirely to others the shape the economy should be pushed to take - the balance between industry and agriculture, between types of industry, between smallscale and capital intensive agriculture, etc. - - and the critical issue of how the surplus is to be distributed internally and between the Bangsa Moro State and those outside who are participating in the development process.

The Philippine Government in the World System

As has already been alluded to, these gross disparities between the Philippine government and the MNLF over conceptualizations of the future are firmly anchored in the structures of the world-system. The government's development model remains adaptively sensitive to all the "new" themes generated in the centers of development thinking in the core nations. "Integrated rural development" follows "basic human needs" as emphasis is directed to the "bottom 40 percent," while all the time the trickle-down model continues to remain firmly in place as the guiding principle of the capitalist world-economy. The mechanisms of linkage between the agencies at the center of the world-

system and the Philippine government's developmentalists are myriad. Many trace to the World Bank and other international organizations from which, periodically, come broad developmental blueprints to guide Philippine development thinking.²⁴ The basic philosophy that shines through these statements of the model is that the Philippines should seek development through ever more intimate integration into the capitalist world-economy. This is spelled out in recommendations for striking down any vestiges of protectionism and embracing an open economy based on export-oriented production -- agricultural as well as industrial -- with heavy reliance on outside "help" in the form of public and private loans for building the needed infrastructural supports. The IMF and the consortium of agency and foreign government representatives comprising the Philippine Consultative Group (with control over the levels of new funding for Philippine development projects) collaborate by providing coercive pressure on the Philippine government in those rare instances when small differences occur between it and the leading spokesmen -- such as the World Bank -- for the accepted model for Third World development. As will be discussed more fully in a moment, transnational corporations figure conspicuously in the model as the vehicles for speeding industrialization, bringing advanced technology to the Third World, and providing access to world markets for the products newly produced for export.

The global development agencies, exercise much more than conceptual guidance on the Philippines. By guiding the selection of one versus another solution to a development problem -- the choice of an energy mix, for example -- these agencies in turn lock the Philippines into reliance on a very limited number of outside suppliers of the technology selected. When coupled with these same agencies' willingness to supply the needed capital directly (through loans) or to assist in assembling it from other sources, the model takes on even greater salience.

The working out at the concrete Philippine level of this broad package of directives from center agencies for "developments" touches areas such as Mindanao directly. The Bank, for instance, has been centrally involved in pushing for the more rapid integration of "frontier" areas that are rich in natural resources, etc., into the mainstream of the Philippine economy.²⁵ Facilitatively, the Bank has funded hydroelectric dams, power grids, road networks, etc., and, with other international (and foreign national) agencies, has pushed its development plans in the face of mounting hostility from the people being displaced in the name of national progress.²⁶ While these global institutions have been instrumental in providing the current ideological and material supports for prying open Mindanao, they are but part of the world-system's cutting edge. Various agencies from the core nations - - and especially from the United States - - work transnationally to advance the capitalist development model in the Third World and to provide the supports and pressures to back up that advocacy. In the case of the Philippines, the American government greatly expanded its economic and military support once Marcos had demonstrated - - by imposing martial law - - his determination to push the Philippines more rapidly in the direction the global "development community" demanded.²⁷

America's direct role in the civil war seems primarily that of supplier of war material and the "models" to guide the Philippine armed forces in their fight against the MNLF and its civilian supporters. Despite the fact that the models - - everything from napalming villages through "free fire zones" to use of armed tribal groups - - never worked in Vietnam, they still remain the "state of the art" in Mindanao, suggesting again the degree of dependence that the Marcos regime has on the American government. In addition, the U.S. remains solidly behind the rapid expansion of the transportation, energy and communication infrastructure projects that are being pushed in the South. While no direct

evidence is available on the point, U.S. general support for the expansion of agribusiness, including increased reliance on the use of "contracts" with small landowners as a way to get around legal limitations on the amount of land a foreign corporation can own and to neutralize some of the small-owner opposition, suggests overall approval of the central agrarian thrust of the Marcos administration in Mindanao: rely on largescale, capital intensive farming - - with much of it in the hands of foreign agribusiness corporations - - for the agricultural development of Mindanao

No brief statement can begin to convey the complexity of the networks of ideas and institutional linkages in the American-Philippine elite alliance system. American AID personnel participate in regional development planning agencies and are deeply involved in the population control program; there are long-standing linkages in the most sensitive units of government - - between the militaries, the police systems, the "intelligence communities," and the most sensitive and powerful of the economic planning and control organs. And there are private organizations that promote the continued cooperation between Filipino and American elites: one has only to look at the networks of "service clubs" like the Rotary that spread across the Philippines to recognize the pervasiveness of these linkage mechanisms. Finally, because they constitute the dominant foreign economic presence in the Philippines, Americans are a central part of the Philippine economy particularly because many of the American corporations command the resources that make it possible for the Philippine government to hope to achieve its developmental goals (in turn, let it be recalled, local concretizations of the more general global capitalist development model).

Despite what has just been said, America's historic hegemonic position in the Philippine economy has undergone erosion in the past decade so that by the end of the 1970s it shared with Japan a near equal position in the import-export trade, and, also with

Japan, its earlier position as the primary source of transnational corporate penetration of the Philippines. While the European nations as well as Australia have also recently expanded their economic activities in the Philippines, it is Japan that has taken the commanding lead among the nations other than the United States in the Philippines economy.²⁸ Like the United States, it has been deeply involved in supporting the expansion of the infrastructure necessary for the effective "opening" of Mindanao, support that began with war-reparations and that continues through direct Japanese government grants and loans as well as through Japanese influence over policy decisions of the Asian Development Bank, itself deeply involved in pushing for the overall development of the Philippines. Moreover, the Japanese government, through its intricate linkages with Japanese corporations, has facilitated their expansion in the Philippines and, in its search for stable sources of raw materials and for areas within which to locate industries that are no longer wanted or profitable in Japan, promises increased support in the future.²⁹

The complex interlocks among the various international, core-national and Philippine government agencies in support of the capitalist development model have as their payoff furthering the integration of the Philippines into the world system on terms that do not threaten the asymmetries built into that system.³⁰ While most of what has been described has taken place on the governmental level, the ultimate benefactors are the corporations and especially the transnational corporations and their Filipino allies at the cutting edge of the capitalist world-economy. While most of the transnational corporate industrial activity is concentrated in the greater Manila area and in the Bataan Export Processing Zone, agribusiness expansion has been highlighted for Mindanao.³¹ In addition, the plan calls for considerable industrialization of the region, with pockets of heavy industry capitalizing on power generated by the hydroelectric dams and a more widespread

reliance on light (including cottage type) and medium industrialization.³²

Because of the high costs associated with infrastructural expansion in Mindanao and with the relatively long gestation period associated with many of the export-agribusiness projects, long-term "stability" is a *sine qua non* for success. But by a stroke of supreme irony, carrying through the largescale public construction projects and securing the land for export-agriculture expansion places the "developers" in direct confrontation with those already living on the land, the great majority of whom become expendable when their lands are coveted by new or expanding plantations, hydroelectric dam builders, power grid planners, etc. The consequences of this fundamental contradiction in the development model has fueled the MNLF struggle, many more localized acts of resistance from tribal and non-Muslim peoples, as well as support for the NPA. In turn, acts of resistance against what to many approach genocidal policies on the part of the government have led the government to create more draconian forms of social control, PANAMIN's (Presidential Assistant on National Minorities) "reservations" for tribal groups it has helped remove from their ancestral lands being one example.³³ The fact that government plans reflect the most current version of an historical tradition of viewing Mindanao as a frontier that Manila has the right to develop plus Mindanao's unique position as the only part of the Philippines not subject to typhoons assures that the Marcos regime will continue to apply extraordinary pressure on behalf of the world development community to shift large sections of the island (the richest agricultural parts) to export crops under large-scale corporate ownership-management. The consequences can only be viewed as devastating to tribal groups cut off from their traditional sources of communal life, to non-Muslim small farmers for the most part lacking tools to defend their land rights or to compete if they are lucky enough to hold on to their land, and to

Muslims largely marginalized by the pace and form of economic development being carried out.³⁴

By way of summary, the Philippine government has been energetically pushing a locally articulated version of the capitalist world-economy route to development in Mindanao as that model is promulgated by spokesmen for and reinforced through institutional support on the part of global and national (core) agencies. The Philippine government is, consequently, in very close alliance³⁵ with extremely powerful (militarily and economically) forces far removed from any direct involvement in the nastier aspects of development while nonetheless supplying the Philippine government with all the military tools it thinks necessary to carry out the tasks of repression in the South. Since the development model to be successful must have access to vast tracts of agricultural land,³⁶ enormous numbers of people have to be pushed out of smallscale or subsistence agriculture, most to be forced to drift to urban centers in the hope of finding employment or, as with the tribal groups, to be crammed into "reservations" of the American Indian variety with all decision-making power safely held by the government.

The strength of the Philippine government in the South rests not on its overwhelming firepower but rather on the condition that its development policies *are* the policies of the dominant global agencies, development experts, world and core-national institutions with which it is intimately allied. This symbiotic relationship provides its leaders with the psychological hubris to push ahead - - and with the military and economic backing required to do so. Frontiers must be "conquered," "opened," "developed," "modernized." These are the catchwords of the late 20th century's version of natural law. But since they are so universally pervasive, they constitute an insidiously powerful subversive weapon against any who would attempt to define the future differently. *Becoming* has been defined by those in control at

the center in universally appealing terms. Those exposed to the socializing forces of this model are inoculated with the virus of this new natural law so that even when they belong to the great majority who will be victimized by the process, they will nevertheless be made passive or frequently willing victims on the hope that on the next turn of the wheel their children will "make it."

The MNLF in the World System

Like the Philippine government in Mindanao, the MNLF serves as the articulator for a way of life, one that would be an alternative to that offered by the Marcos regime. The alternative would guarantee to Muslims the security of territorial home within which they could safely live lives centered on *being* members of an *Islamic community*.³⁷ Also like the Philippine government's position in a global alliance system, the MNLF struggles on behalf of a "world" community (Dar al Islam) that on some dimensions represents a degree of integration far in advance of that of the world system into which the Philippine government is comfortably ensconced. On other dimensions the integration is much lower and on some it breaks down into open conflict.

There is general agreement that the Muslim population in Mindanao has not only shared in the growing Islamic consciousness that has been pronounced aspect of much of the Islamic world, but has made even more gains than many other areas. Once relatively isolated from the main currents of Islamic culture, Mindanao has undergone, according to many observers, a deepening of its Islamic ties. Increasing numbers of young people travel to centers of Islamic learning in the Middle East later to return to help strengthen the faith. Teachers and scholars from other Islamic countries have spent years helping establish schools and other Islamic institutions in Mindanao, while an ever-increasing number

of Muslims from the South become *hadji* by making a pilgrimage to Mecca.³⁸ The physical manifestation of this Islamic resurgence is everywhere seen in the new mosques and the improvements of old in Mindanao, reflecting increased popular support. In its most concrete form, the new level of Islamic consciousness is expressed in the relatively large numbers of recruits who over the years have joined the MNLF to fight against the Philippine government and for the opportunity to form a more complete Islamic community.

This heightened Islamic consciousness on the part of Mindanao Muslims ties them ever more closely into the world Islamic community, probably more completely -- in the sense of incorporating them along a much wider set of values -- than would be true for non-Muslim Filipinos in their relationships with the larger world-system for which the Philippine government speaks.³⁹ The value system that provides the "model" for linking Mindanao into Dar al Islam is bedded in the basic teachings of the Koran and the rich sources of Islamic law that are meant to guide the everyday affairs of Muslims. Despite strong differences between the two major sets -- the majority Sunni and the minority Shiah -- there remains a fundamental agreement over the broad essentials of Islam so that the world Islamic model links Mindanao Muslims into a true world community.

This community, however, is forced to live in a world-system dominated by others and organized, economically, around values that direct assault the centrality that Islam claims for itself in the organization of society. Because it must continue to adjust to the more powerful capitalist world-economy, the Islamic community cannot remain contented with *being*, with putting into practice the Islamic way of life, but must increasingly articulate alternatives in the very sectors of life -- those having to do with economic development -- over which the capitalist nations (and, for that matter, the socialist in an alternate model) hold hegemonic con-

trol.

It is at this point that the weakness of the Islamic world community appears, that the unity falters. Long successful at defending the Islamic world from annihilation during the long era of colonialism and brilliantly successful in spearheading the national liberation movements that did so much to end that era,⁴⁰ newly independent Muslim nations attempted a variety of solutions to the problem of how to come to terms with the demands for economic development, for "modernization" and "industrialization," etc. Some new Islamic nations attempted to build Islamic socialist societies while others pushed extremely conservative forms of change. Over time there has emerged, however, a crude, pragmatic accommodation with the capitalist world-economy, with some Islamic nations still voicing (state) socialist rhetoric while behaving as solid members of the world-system and most still holding to the belief that Islam can control the excesses of capitalism while permitting it to run its course.

It remains to be seen - - especially in light of the unfinished Iranian revolution - - whether the lack of a clear-cut alternative model for economic development of the Islamic world community will constitute a serious flaw in Islam. Lack of such a model, let alone agreement on what it might begin to look like, has already provided the basis for deep-seated divisions in nearly every Muslim nation, divisions between nationalist Westerners, religious reformers and defenders of more traditional positions, the latter claiming that Islam *is* the model.⁴¹ One attempt to answer this important question of Islam's potential for promoting development is Rodinson's classic study of Islam and capitalism. He includes that the historic failure of Islam to build a society that can place effective limits on the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small elite at the expense of the majority of the people constitutes a major weakness in the face of competing models for fashioning a more productive future.⁴² In a frontier zone such as

Mindanao where the Islamic world community directly confronts the aggressive, expansive capitalist world-economy's model for rapidly promoting "development," the absence of a clearly articulated Islamic development model constitutes a weakness. The tendency on the part of most Muslims to work pragmatically within the framework of the world-system leaves those co-religionists such as in Mindanao who are only now being forced into the global system largely without support. As the full force of the capitalist model is imposed on the Muslims of Mindanao they become increasingly marginalized⁴³ and more open to the appeals of the MNLF. But simultaneously the Islamic world community cannot provide a positive alternative development model that could guide their responses to the challenge. Lacking that model, the MNLF remains terribly vulnerable to moves on the part of the Marcos regime to coopt its members: probably all Muslims in Mindanao have by this time been exposed to the promises and material benefits of the capitalist world-economy model. With the Islamic world community offering only a variant of that same model, it is understandable why defections occur and why the MNLF appeal has not been more successful.

Other Islamic world community decisions have also significantly affected the prospects of the MNLF. While individual Islamic nations have from the beginning provided varying amounts (at best always in limited amounts) of military equipment and financial support to the MNLF, the only organized political forum for Islam - - the Islamic Conference - - has consistently worked to find a political solution to the civil war. This is not to ignore that at times the Islamic Conference (IC) has given its backing to very strong charges made by the MNLF against the Marcos regime, as for example, genocide,⁴⁴ and has consistently shown concern over the injustices inflicted by the Philippine government on Muslims in Mindanao. But the IC has pushed through the years of the conflict against the original demands of the MNLF for the "libe

ration of our Bangsa Moro homeland'⁴⁵ and the creation of an independent sovereign state. By 1976 the IC had forced the MNLF to accept a compromise with the Philippine government and to accede to "autonomy" within the Philippine nation rather than independence. In the four years since that agreement -- the Tripoli Agreement signed December 23, 1976 -- was negotiated, negotiations have repeatedly broken down while at the same time the Philippine government has unilaterally "implemented" its version of autonomy in two of the southern regions. The government's attempts to exclude representatives of the Islamic world community (the IC) from involvement in these negotiations has given the MNLF a small degree of "space" within which to attempt to regain the initiative it once had and lost when the IC forced it to give up its goal of independence. The government's unilateralness in implementing the autonomy agreement and its intransigence in negotiations with the MNLF (as well as its stepped-up military offensive in the South) give great credence to the MNLF's claim that nothing has changed and that a return to a more militant stance behind the goal of national independence should be the strategy for the movement.⁴⁶

Just as the Islamic world community is hobbled in dealing with the threat the capitalist world-economy model poses in an area such as Mindanao because of its own deep involvement in that system and its consequent inability to voice an alternative, similarly it is hobbled by the world-system within which it operates from giving more than token support to its Muslim brothers in the South. Sharp ideological cleavages exist within the IC to weaken any escalation in the support given the MNLF and cross-cutting cleavages also exist between pro-Islamic ties and those linking IC member nations to the larger non-Muslim world. Marcos, for example, was able to tap his close ASEAN ties by pressuring Indonesia and Malaysia to work on his behalf in the 1980 IC conference.⁴⁷

These cleavages encourage the continuation of factionalism in the Mindanao Muslim community and within the MNLF.⁴⁸ Importantly, they seem to sustain the two MNLF factions and, with non-Muslim international support, other groups as well.⁴⁹ Overall, they reflect the inability of the Islamic world community to provide the MNLF with a viable development model to counter that which was proffered by Marcos or to back it with sufficient military, economic and diplomatic support to pressure the Marcos regime into making meaningful concessions to the Muslim population.

The lack of other than a generalized Islamic ideological framework within which to articulate the goals of the MNLF makes its publications strangely devoid of statements on what an independent Bangsa Moro State might be used for other than for the protection of an Islamic way of life - - for protection (*being*), not for transformation (*becoming*). One astute observer of the situation has noted that the MNLF seems geared primarily to carry on military operations, not to work to politicize the population where it is active. The same observer notes how on the other hand the New People's Army (NPA), active in some of the same areas, works to organize a mass base first, fighting only when absolutely necessary.⁵⁰ The fact that in 1978 the MNLF publication *Mahardika* thanked the National Democratic Front (NDF) for its support of the "right of the Bangsa Moro people to national self-determination" while at the same time admitting that its editors had not seen the "ten-point program" of the NDF (even though it was several years old at the time) supports the contention that lack of development and political models beyond simple Islamic protectionism constitutes a serious weakness in the Islamic world community and in its specific concretization in the MNLF.¹⁵ As mentioned earlier (footnote 17), the MNLF has recently stated that, in parallel with "national democratic forces in north and central Philippines," it is fighting against the "Philip-

pine puppet regime and U.S. imperialism.”⁵² To the degree that American involvement in the civil war becomes more direct rather than indirect, meaningful cooperation between the two forces becomes more of a possibility, including ideological development.⁵³

One should not overestimate this possibility, however. The leadership, as noted earlier, has made vague references to Islamic socialism as one of the goals of the movement. That this goal is not stressed or developed is understandable in view of the internal semi-feudal class patterns that constitute Mindanao society and of the sources of external support upon which the movement relies. If these pressures constrain the movement's ideological struggle, they may account in part for its emphasis on military action, almost to the degree that such action is viewed as central for building faith in the movement.⁵⁴ And since so much of the MNLF program is based on *protecting* the Islamic way of life, there is not too much leeway for ideological growth so long as the focus remains what it is. In fact, the vast transformation that is being forced on all people in Mindanao - - Muslims, Christians, and those not integrated into either faith - - by the relentless push of the capitalist world-economy, working as it does with its Philippine government allies, will probably create more new candidates for the NPA than it does for the MNLF. This is simply because its appeal is not hobbled by the exclusiveness of a religion test nor by protecting existing exploitative class relationships. There is, of course, a time and place for *protective* ethnic (religious community) action. One such is Muslim Mindanao where the full force of the capitalist world-economy is posed to destroy older forms of social organization. The MNLF, by promising to protect the Islamic way of life, cannot stop this process, but it might make the “great transformation” somewhat less costly by leading the Muslim population into the capitalist world-economy - - which as argued previously is substantively what the Islamic world commu-

nity has accepted as its economic development program - - on terms that provide a sense of dignity and continuity with the past. Moreover, if successful, the MNLF's goal of independence would find the Bangsa Moro State in control over vast resources that, even if "developed" in cooperation with outsiders, would leave considerably more for the region than could ever be possible under the Philippine government's development model. This is especially true since the implementation of its visions for the future of Mindanao will largely be carried out by the same institutions and classes that historically have viewed Mindanao as an open, undeveloped frontier area to be developed through internal migration and, more recently, government and private corporation action planned from the center. This model can have little place for the Muslim community except at the bottom (recognizing that a few will be coopted into the establishment) and even less respect for traditional claims that community might have over the land and the resources it contains.

Conclusions

The drive of Manila-based governments to penetrate and incorporate Mindanao into the Philippine political economy began to gather momentum under American colonial guidance during which time many of the tools for pushing aside indigenous people were created. These include genocidal military campaigns, land-grabbing, collusion between the government and private corporations to circumvent restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land and, more recently, the use of "reservations" as a method to control populations being removed from lands they once used. This drive, which gathered momentum under American tutelage during the anti-Huk campaign in the 1950s with its "re-settlement on Mindanao" program, has taken a quantum jump

in the 1970s. The turn to fuller incorporation into the capitalist world-economy that the Marcos martial law era represents brought the Philippines into closer working relationships with the various international developmental institutions - - the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, etc. - - and with the powerful pressures directed from the core nations (largely the United States and Japan) for a more complete opening of the country to the corporate interests represented by the transnational corporations.⁵⁵ The end product is a transnational alliance for development along lines clearly set down by the center. This world-system model for development - - for *becoming* - - is a powerful tool for guiding the global assault on areas such as Mindanao where, despite earlier enclaves of export-oriented agribusiness, mining and even industrial development, vast tracts have remained largely outside full integration into the capitalist world-economy.

By spearheading this assault, the Philippine government has destroyed an earlier (unstable) equilibrium in Mindanao and unleashed a defensive struggle by the Islamic community to protect itself from cultural genocide and from being further deprived of its natural resources and more completely exploited. The Philippine government brings to its war with the MNLF the massive military backup supplied by the United States and the vast economic resources provided by national and international agencies, public and private. Possibly just as important, the Philippine government is also armed with a model for development that at this stage represents very nearly a "natural law" for elites and aspiring members of an emergent middleclass who benefit so directly from it.

Against his formidable alliance stands the MNLF and its Islamic world community allies. While few of its members are newly rich from OPEC earnings, practically all are comfortably incorporated in the capitalist world-economy. There, except for cooperation within OPEC, Islamic nations act individually in their

interaction with the world economic system, cooperating in the Islamic Conference on a limited number of political matters. The result, relative to the MNLF, has been some military and economic support from a very small number of Islamic nations and diplomatic pressure from the IC to accede to the Philippine government's modest concessions (largely cosmetic) while simultaneously giving a bit stronger rhetorical support for its Muslim brothers in Mindanao.

The greatest weakness, however, in the Islamic world community's role in the MNLF struggle is its inability to provide an alternative development model to counter that which is available to the Philippine government. Its implicit claim that Islam *is* the model remains unconvincing in view of the obvious inroads that the capitalist model has made in the Islamic world, the current Iranian revolution remaining an open question. If a Bangsa Moro State is merely going to work from the same economic development goals that guide the Philippine government but is going to do so under a less clear idea of what is happening, then the MNLF's position is significantly weakened. Many Muslims will be tempted to work directly with the establishment forces since their goals are better articulated and backed by markedly superior resources.

As a movement dedicated to national liberation for the defense of the Moro community the MNLF is on more solid ground. While, if successful, the Bangsa Moro State would remain constrained to live within the capitalist world-economy, it could nonetheless have some say over how the relationships would be articulated with that economy and to a degree over the pace of incorporation. Defense of the Islamic way of life could provide the framework within which the Muslim society could develop with less likelihood of living out a new round of second-class status within a Philippines dedicated to carrying on what appear to many to be old colonial patterns vis-a-vis the Moros, only now to be pushed with all the vigor its international allies bring to the enterprise.

Should such an MNLF victory - - either in its national independence sense (highly unlikely) or in a regional autonomy form that brings real concessions on the part of the Philippine government to the Moro community - - be achieved, the "space" gained would only be provisional. It would give the Mindanao Islamic community the opportunity to achieve new levels of development in the process of which new forces would be unleashed that would carry the struggle to new levels that would eliminate the need to organize along narrow, religious lines.

NOTES

- * I wish to extend a note of appreciation to Tayyab Mahmud and Syed M. Abidi for their generous help on Islamic materials and for their useful critical suggestions.
- 1. This is the most recent figure used by the MNLF in its presentations to international audiences. See Abdurasad Asani, "Imperialist Conspiracy in the Bangsamoro Homeland," Speech by the representative of the MNLF at the "Oil Workers Anti-Monopolist World Conference," March 26-30, 1980, p. 2.
- 2. Abdurasad Asani (for Nur Misuari), "Appeal of the Bangsa Moro People to the International League for the Rights and Liberation of People," June 10, 1979. Appeal before the International Tribunal of Peoples, Bolonga, Italy, June 24, 1979, p. 9.
- 3. The 500,000 figure for Muslim refugees has been the most frequently mentioned in MNLF statements. A much higher figure for "evacuees" was admitted by the Philippine government's Department of Social Welfare Annual Report for FY 1973-1974 (the last such government mention of an evacuee figure): 1.9 million, a figure that includes all those affected by the government's anti-NPA, anti-tribal, and anti-MNLF campaigns. Cf. Joel Rocamora, "Agribusiness, Dams and Counter-Insurgency," *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 67 (October 1979), p. 7, and *The Refugee Crisis in the Philippines* (n. p.: Anti-Martial Law Coalition, 1977).
- 4. In partial defense of the media, the Mindanao war has characteristics that make it unlikely ever to become a popular media event. Fighting

is scattered, intermittent, fluid, punctuated by extended truce periods, and given to long spells where, the only "action" is political and diplomatic.

5. Without specifying particular aspects of their work, here are the studies that have been most helpful to me: G. Carter Bentley, "Islamic Law in Christian Southeast Asia: The Politics of Establishing Shari'a Courts in the Philippines." Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies meeting, November 1979; Eugenio A. Demigillo, "Mindanao: Development and Marginalization," *Third World Studies. The Philippines in the Third World Papers. Series No. 20*, August 1979; Alunan C. Glang, *Muslim Secession or Integration?* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1969); Peter G. Gowing, "Of Different Minds: Christian and Muslim Ways of Looking at Their Relations," *International Review of Missions* 67 (January 1978: 74-85; Peter G. Gowing, *Muslim-Filipinos - - Heritage and Horizon* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979); Cesar A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of Philippines Press, 1973); Lela G. Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front," *Pacific Affairs*, 49:3 (Fall 1976): 405-424; Joel Rocamora, "The Political Uses of PANAMIN," *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 67 (October 1979): 11-21; Elmer di Vigilia, *Problems of Muslim Integration* (Manila: De La Salle University. History-Political Science and East Asian Studies, 1977).
6. The original ideas of the world-system model were advanced in Wallerstein's macro-history of the origins of the European world-economy, later further developed in essays subsequently assembled in book form. The former is *The Modern World-System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (NY: Academic Press, 1976); the latter *The Capitalist World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). A rich literature based on applications of the framework already exists. The larger part is to be found in the journal *Review* published by the Wallerstein group, and in the "Political Economy of the World-System Annuals" in which papers on selected themes are published. The most recent annual is titled *Processes of the World-System*, edited by Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980). Wallerstein's work has also generated considerable critical comment. See, for example, Theda Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (March 1977); Ira Gerstein, "Theories of the World Economy and Imperialism," *The Insurgent Sociologist*, 7:2 (Spring 1977); Aristide R. Zolberg, "Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link," paper presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, September 2, 1979; and Craig A. Lackard, "Global History, Modernization and the World-System Ap-

proach: A Critique,:: paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies meeting, March 21-23, 1980.

7. Examples of this are the rubber and pineapple plantations developed by the Americans in the 1920s and the agricultural development carried out by Japanese settlers in the 1920s and 1930s. Where the Philippines as a whole stands in the world-system seems relatively clear: most, I believe, would place it in the peripheral state category, although Peter Evans in developing his case study on Brazil in which he drew on the work of Wallerstein found the Philippines included in one of the key indices measuring "semi-peripheral" state status. See his *Dependent Development. The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 295, and, for a discussion of the concept and measurement of semi-periphery, pp. 290-297.
8. See Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy, op. cit.*, for various essays discussing these assertions. Also see Andre Gunder Frank, "Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor," *Review*, 1:1 (Summer 1977). Edward Friedman has recently analyzed the post-Mao Chinese developments from this perspective in "Maoist Conceptualizations of the Capitalist World-System," in Hopkins and Wallerstein (eds.), *op. cit.* Susan Eckstein,, although somewhat critical of the Wallerstein paradigm, found it a useful tool for understanding Cuban development problems: "Capitalist Constraints on Cuban Socialist Development," *Comparative Political* 12:3 (April 1980).
9. The MNLF charges the Philippine government with "statistical genocide" because of its consistent underestimation of the number of Muslims in the south. Gowing notes that the government gives the figure as 1.8 million vs. 6 million Christians and 2 million "Hill tribes" people (in *Muslim Filipinos, op. cit.*, inside back cover. In the text, Gowing uses a figure of 2.2 million Muslims in the south: p. 208). After claiming "statistical genocide," the MNLF proceeds to claim a total of 5,454,618 Muslims in Bangsa Moro in 1975 out of a total population in the region of 9,599,127. It further claims that many of the "indigenous and Christian natives" accept the concept of Bangsa Moro and that only "2,781, 097 (?) colonial migrants" should not be included in the proposed Bang-

sa Moro "autonomous" region. See "White Paper" Lies of the Philippine Government." Office of the Chairman, Central Committee, Moro National Liberation Front. (No date, no place, ca. late 1977, based on the date of Nur Misuari's letter contained in the same publication.)

10. See Clifford Geertz for the most generous statement of the hard-line, nation-building view. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States," in Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963). Cynthia H. Enloe's *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) represents a bridge between the older orthodoxy and a new situational political ethnic relative to ethnic politics. More recently she has creatively probed areas where world-system agencies manipulate ethnic groups for purposes of maintaining dominance structures. See "State-Building and Ethnic Structures: Dependence on International Capitalist Penetration," in Hopkins/Wallerstein, *op. cit.* Wallerstein, however, has done the most to re-analyze the whole question of ethnic politics in poor nations. In a series of essays now available in his *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Wallerstein argues that in many (most) periphery nations objective conditions do not yet exist for a class-based political struggle. He sees ethno-national forms of political mobilization as perfectly proper channels through which to carry on mass political struggle while recognizing, obviously, the potential ambiguities that exist. While he does not explore the political economy of small ethno-nations seeking independence from existing nation-states, he would probably support their demands if it could be demonstrated that their struggle would weaken the capitalist world-economy. Unfortunately, most breakaway ethno-national movements seem to be supported by one or another major capitalist(core)state.
11. Maxime Rodinson, among others, gives Islam credit for having produced a whole generation of national independence movements that did much to bring colonialism to an end. He believes, however, that Islam is most unlikely to provide an ideology for mobilizing people for *economic* development. See his *Islam and Capitalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).
12. *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 4, 1980, p. 1. While Khomeini deserves the highest respect for his role in the movement that overthrow the American-supported shah, the choices facing Iran are not those he simplistically suggests.

13. Peter Gowing, in contrasting Christian Filipinos with the Moros argues that the former organize their lives around secular values, relegating religion to a relatively minor place. In contrast, the Muslim Filipinos are "... self-consciously committed to ordering their lives around the teachings and practices of Islam." He concludes that the Christian Filipinos are living in an "age of Politics" while the Moros are living in an "age of Faith." See *Muslim Filipinos, op. cit.*, pp. 204-205.
14. Nur Misuari, Chairman, Central Committee, MNLF, in *Mahardika*, 1:3 (March 1974), p. 13. *Mahardika* is the official publication of the MNLF, is published in Tripoli.
15. Noble, *op. cit.*, p. 416.
16. In addition to Mindanao, the Bangsa Moro State would include Basilan, the Sulu archipelago, and Palawan.
17. Only in a 1980 publication was this changed. In a short speech in which the "national democratic forces" were commended for fighting against the "Philippine puppet regime and U.S. imperialism" in the north and central Philippines, the spokesman for the MNLF ended with "Victory to all working peoples of the World! Victory to all Liberation Movements!" He was addressing a meeting of the "Oil Workers Anti-Monopolist World Conference" in Tripoli, March 26, 1980.
18. Samuel K. Tan, *The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle 1900-1972* (Manila: Filipinas Foundation, 1977), p. 149.
19. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos, op. cit.*, p. 81.
20. Stang, in a provocative study of the similarities and differences between "Westernness" and Islam, notes that there is no distinction between *being* and *becoming* in Arabic in a time sense. See Hakan Stang, "Westernness and Islam." Trends in Western Civilization. Program No. 7. Chair in Conflict and Peace Research. Paper No. 27 (Oslo: University of Oslo, 1976), p. 3.
21. In an exhaustive study of Islamic experiences with capitalism, Rodinson concludes that while Islam may not be the most receptive climate for the growth of capitalism, nothing in its doctrine stands in the way of accepting capitalist penetration, and that Islamic capitalism - - in either

its indigenous or exogenous versions - - seems behaviorally to operate similarly to capitalism in an earlier era in a Christian setting. See his *Islam and Capitalism, op. cit.*

22. Johan Galtung has developed an analysis of the "bourgeois way of life" as it is intimately associated with two global processes he believes are rapidly becoming common across all systems. These two are a technocratic mode of production, the other a common political-military-police power structure. See his "Global Goals, Global Processes and the Prospects for Human and Social Development," United Nations University, October 1979, and "Aspects of the Modern System as a Social Formation," 1979.
23. The point should be made again that Islam has not as yet been able to provide such an alternative development model.
24. Examples include the World Bank study *The Philippines. Priorities and Prospects for Development* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1976) or *Sharing in Development. A Programme of Employment, Equity and Growth for the Philippines* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1974). The Asian Development Bank has published a more general development statement in which the Philippines is one of a number of nations addressed: *Rural Asia. Challenge and Opportunity* (New York: Praeger, 1977).
25. Cynthia H. Enloe has written about how ethnic conflict typically erupts in frontier areas where an earlier balance between state control and local ethnic groups has been broken by a new era of state expansion. Writing specifically about the Philippines, she concludes that "... new pressures on . . . Muslims in Mindanao to be integrated as marginalized groups within the Philippine ethnic structure for the sake of a more powerful Philippine state structure would not be feasible without foreign penetration from M.N.C.s, the World Bank, and the I.M.F." In "State-Building and Ethnic Structures: Dependence on International Capitalist Penetration," in Hopkins and Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 280.
26. Lindy Washburn, in a presentation at the June 1979 meeting of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, documented the highly destabilizing effects of the hydroelectric dams on Muslim communities in the region. See "The Maranaos and the Agus River Hydroelectric Project," *Research Bulletin*, Dansalan Research Center, Vol. III, No. 3-4 (November-December, 1977), and "On the Rise and Fall of Lake Lanao," No. 11-12

(July -Aug. 1978) for the data upon which the talk was based. She has also examined another of the Bank's projects in "Our Land for Others? Maranao Muslims vs. the Philippine National Power Corporation," presented at the Association for Asian Studies meeting, March, 1980.

27. See Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, *The Logistics of Repression* (Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977) for "before" and "after" martial law U.S. support figures. This support has been further increased as a consequence of the military bases agreement signed in January 1979.
28. See Mamoru Tsuda, *A Preliminary Study of Japanese-Filipino Joint Ventures* (Manila: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978) for a comprehensive examination of Japanese corporate activities in the Philippines.
29. A recent discussion of Japan's future plans drew from a "think piece" sponsored by the Ohira cabinet in late 1978 titled "A Design for a Pan-Pacific Economic Community." The "plan" which had already been worked out by individual Japanese corporations calls for utilizing Japanese capital and technology, in close collaboration with Australia which has some much needed raw materials, to "industrialize" ASEAN into a semi-processing industrial base. This will supply Japan with an "uninterrupted supply of natural resources in a semi-processed form." See *Christian Responsibility and Asian Solidarity*. Report of a Regional Conference on Human Rights in the Philippines, Manila and Tokyo, September 1979 (Hong Kong: Resource Centre for Philippine Concerns, 1980), p. 69. Where Japanese industry is not directly interested in relocating in the Philippines (as Kawasaki Steel was for its highly polluting sintering operations), the Japanese government at times directly supports projects as it currently is doing the Philippine government's proposal for a blast furnace to add to its steel-making capacity in Mindanao. The Japanese government through its Japan International Cooperation Agency did the feasibility study for the Philippine government, with the Japanese government concluding that while it would not finance the proposal through "official development assistance," it would help through an export-import bank loan and would help secure other foreign exim bank support along with a syndicated loan through international commercial banks. For an account, see *Manila Journal*, September 17-23, 0. 14.
30. See Robert B. Stauffer, "The American Development Model: Hidden

- Agenda for the Third World” for a fuller discussion of this point. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 2.:3 (April 1977). This argument does not follow the “stagnationist” version of dependency theory, nor does it support the uncritically optimistic view of the late Bill Warren about the equalizing impact of capitalist world economy in its current impact on Third World nations. Rather it recognizes the highly unequal nature of Third World industrialization and the extreme limits of the current export-oriented model. For a useful critique of the Warren position see Doug McEachern and Greg O’Leary, “Capitalist Recession and the Third World: Reflections on the Warren Thesis,” *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, No. 7 (April 1980).
31. See Republic of the Philippines. *Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, 1978-1982, Including the Ten-Year Development Plan, 1978-1987* (Manila: September 1977) for details.
 32. Demigillo notes that shortly after promulgating the current five-year plan the government retreated from its commitment to heavy industrialization of the region because of the continued unstable conditions resulting from the civil war. These conditions have held back expected foreign investment. Despite this, however, it appears as if the long-range commitment remains. See Dimigillo, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
 33. See Joel Rocamora, “The Political Uses of PANAMIN,” *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 57 (October, 1979), and “A Report on PANAMIN in Mindanao,” in *A Report on the Tribal Filipinos in Mindanao* (no date, no place, no author. (ca 1977, Manila). There is a large literature on how the regime gives its support to land theft in Mindanao. Cf. Lindy Washburn, “Our Land for Others?” *op. cit.*; Robin Broad, “Our Children are Being Kidnapped: The Story of Del Monte’s Philippine Packing Corporation in Bukidnon,” mimeo, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, June 1978; Joel Rocamora, “Agribusiness, Dams and Counter-Insurgency,” *op. cit.*; Frances Moore Lappe, Joseph Collins and Eleanor McCallie, “Banana Hunger,” Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1977; and Eugenio A. Demigillo, *op. cit.*
 34. See Demigillo, *op. cit.*, p. 9 for the argument that the development policies of the Philippine government are marginalizing the Muslim population in Mindanao.
 35. This is certainly not to argue that there is a complete harmony of inter-

ests between all those involved in the "alliance." Many of Marcos' projects - - especially ones from which he or his close associates are slated to benefit directly - - run into opposition from outsiders. Further, some of his policies may cause some lower-level American officials, for example, to voice criticism as in the case of human rights issues. The United States government, in the latter case, however, clearly places its military and economic interests well ahead of any sentimental concern over human rights.

36. It might be noted that the five-year plan mentions shifting some land to largescale production of corn for animal feed. This suggests that Mindanao will also be caught in the drive for beef and feed for beef - - both likely (under market conditions) to end up as exports to the rich countries of the North. Cf. Ernest Feder, "The Odious Competition between Man and Animal over Agricultural Resources in the Underdeveloped Countries," *Review* 3:3 (Winter 1980). He has been currently working on a case study of the effects of the government's agricultural development policies in Mindanao.
37. Although the MNLF frequently lays claim to speaking for other people - - non-Muslims - - in the area, such a claim in fact undercuts its central ideological position which remains that of safeguarding the right of Islamic peoples to live lives fully in harmonious conformity with the moral precepts and legal codes of the Islamic faith. For the very reason that Islam is a vibrant, living religion that directly addresses day-to-day life, it must of necessity place all non-Muslims who share its territory in a somewhat second-class position vis-a-vis the majority. See G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 186-187 on this point.
38. For evidence of this deepening of Islamic consciousness in Mindanao see Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, *op. cit.*, pp. 136ff.; Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Noble, *op. cit.*, p. 407. A similar development has been observed in Indonesia, Cf. Sidney R. Jones, "'It Can't Happen Here', A Post-Khomeini Look at Indonesian Islam," *Asian Survey* 20:3 (March 1980).
39. I recognize that there are no empirical data available to substantiate this comparative assertion. I would note, however, the observation made by Rodinson that capitalism provides a very weak "mobilizing power" for the organization of mass support for economic development, suggesting that this is because it taps a more narrow set of values. *Op. cit.*, pp. 219-220.

40. Jansen develops this point, concluding with the question "Could there have been an Afro-Asian [nationalist] movement without Islam?" which he answers in the negative. *Op. cit.*, pp. 95-96. Islam has on this score been highly successful, there now being some 56 Muslim governments represented in the United Nations (*Ibid.*, p. 63).
41. See Jansen, *op. cit.*, pp. 134ff, and p. 164.
42. Rodinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-182, and 215 ff.
43. Again, see the excellent analysis of this by Demigillo, *op. cit.*
44. The IC later dropped this charge.
45. Stated in the first issue of *Mahardika* (December 1973) along with a proposed national flag, etc. A few months later Nur Misuari wrote: ". . . the future is bright. Insha-Allah, someday we shall be like our other brothers in the world - - free, sovereign, and independent - - master of own national destiny," *Mahardika* (March 1974), pp. 12-13.
46. The push to convince the IC that national independence should be made the goal of the MNLF was made by Nur Misuari at the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held in Bangladesh in May, 1980. At that conference Misuari - - head of a five-member MNLF delegation accorded "permanent observer status" in the IC - - gave an address in which he "sought support for a return to his original demand for secession of the Moro provinces from the Philippines." The IC did not support his request although it did vote the usual rhetorical resolution calling on all Islamic nations to give the MNLF support by applying "economic, social and political pressure on the Philippine government to induce it to implement . . . the Tripoli Agreement . . . [and to] continue granting material assistance to the MNLF." *Ang Katipunan* (July 1980), p. 2. Iran called attention to the fact that it had already begun to apply economic pressure by suspending the sale of petroleum to the Philippines.
47. See Sheilah Ocampo, "Calling in the Neighbors," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (February 8, 1980), pp. 18-19.
48. For example, Richard Vokey points out how struggles over foreign military supplies have exacerbated factionalism. "Khomeini's hand in the Islamic glove," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (April 11, 1980), p. 22.
49. The Hashim Salamat MNLF splinter group has its base in Cairo which

technically puts it outside the IC since Egypt was expelled from the IC in 1978. On the international connections of these factional groups see the accounts cited in the previous two footnotes.

50. Sheilah Ocampo, "Guerillas gain is paradise lost," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (April 11, 1980), p. 20.
51. See *Mabardika* (July-August, 1978), p. 12.
52. Abdurasad Asani, "Imperialist Conspiracy," *op. cit.*, p. 2, emphasis added. Note that the cooperation seems limited to the military forces of the NDF - - the NPA - - operating in the north and central Philippines, not in the south! Sheilah Ocampo ("Guerillas," *op. cit.*, p. 20) notes that the NPA has been much more effective than the MNLF in organizing the mass of peasants victimized by the Marcos development policies in the South, especially the non-Christian tribals and "disgruntled farmers and dispossessed settlers."
53. There appeared in 1980 new charges that the U.S. was already actively engaged in military support actions in the civil war, charges that had been made in the early years of the war as well. See Asani, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3, and E. San Juan, Jr. "The Moro People versus the Marcos Dictatorship," *Philippine Times* (April 22-28, 1980), p. 11.
54. This approaches the line of advocacy (mistakenly) attributed to Frantz Fanon, i.e., that "violence is always purgative." See Immanuel Wallerstein "Fanon and the Revolutionary Class," *op. cit.*, p. 251. Wallerstein argues convincingly that Fanon was not guilty of "Fanonism" (of which the special role of violence is only a part), but rather that he fully understood the class nature of colonial regimes and proposed a strategy, accordingly, of building a revolutionary movement on the colonial class - - the peasants - - most likely to take risks. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
55. The recent opening of the rural banking system to foreign equity suggests how open the system has become. See *Manila Journal*, May 26-June 1, 1980, p. 4.