

## RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF THE MORO WARS

Francisco Demetrio, S.J.

The title of this paper as assigned to me was "The Religious Implications in Moro History." I would like to recast that title this way: "The Religious Implications of Moro History." Nor is that all; I would rather limit myself to only one segment of Moro history, namely, the "Moro Wars." Nor am I going to take in the *whole* of the Moro wars. Professor Majul divides these wars into 6 stages from 1565 to 1898.<sup>1</sup> My division, for purpose of this paper, is simpler. It will only have 3 stages: First stage: 1665 to 1685; second: 1685 to 1772; and third: 1772 to 1898. Nor do I propose to cover the entire 3 stages. I shall limit myself only to the first stage. And I shall necessarily be choosy in the episodes I discuss. There will only be three: First, the War against the Brunei undertaken by Gov. General Francisco Sande in 1578; second, the war against the Sulus and the Maguindanaos undertaken by Figueroa, de Xara and Ronquillo; (1956 and onwards); and third, the War against Kudarat by Corcuera, and Atienza against the Maranaos (1637 and onwards).

Therefore the title of the paper should be changed to: "The Religious Dimensions of the Moro Wars."

However, before we undertake these 3 events, there will be two prolegomena or preliminary discussions: the first will be on the "rights" Spain had in order to conquer and hold on to the portions of the Philippines which were subjugated by the conquistadores; and second, the precise meaning we would like to understand by the term "religious dimensions" when applied to these events. After these discussions, we can make value judgments on the so-called Moro Wars, based on religious principles which are commonly accepted by the world, "religious" among whom are to be numbered both Islam and Christianity.

**I. By what right did Spain enter the Philippines and by what right did she decide to remain?**

Soon after the pacification of Manila, and outlying regions like the Camarines, Ilocos and others, there was a lively controversy among Spanish thinkers as to whether the Spanish king had a right to the temporal dominion of the Philippines. There were at least 3 positions: two of these we may call extreme, and the third, the middle-of-the-liner, which eventually won out.

One extreme position was based on the doctrine of natural slavery. It taught that:

Those who excel in prudence and talent, even if not in physical strength, are by nature masters; on the other hand, the slow and dull of wit, though physically vigorous . . . are slaves by nature, and . . . for these latter, it is not only just but also useful to serve those who are by nature masters . . .<sup>2</sup>

The other extreme position was that the use of arms in winning peoples to the Christian faith and allegiance to Spain was altogether unjust. This position was held by those who maintained that it was possible to introduce the Christian faith permanently in pagan lands by means of missionaries preaching there without armed protection. This absolute trust in weak and wayward human nature was greater than what was warranted by the experience of actual mission conditions.<sup>3</sup>

[For] the truth of the matter was that, while these people were fully human beings with all the rights inherent in human nature, they were also for the most part barbarians brutalized by their savage way of life, insensible in their present state to purely moral or spiritual considerations unless they were backed by a pretty tangible manifestation of physical power. It was therefore naive to expect them to receive peaceably missionaries who came armed only with the power of the gospel.<sup>4</sup>

As further elaboration of these positions, it is good to bring in the opinion of the first bishop of Manila, Bishop Domingo Salazar. He said that there were only two titles whereby the Spanish king could base his claim of sovereignty over the islands: by title of election, and by title of

just war. For the title by election to be justified, these conditions must be obtained: 1) all or the majority of the natives must have elected the king of Spain as their king, too; 2) the lords of these towns and provinces must have agreed together and consented to the choice or election, and 3) that this election was free, without the intervention of force, violence, fear or deceit.<sup>5</sup>

The fact of the matter was that the natives were not consulted on the "choice" of the king of Spain as their king; nor did their chiefs agree to have him king; nor was their choice, if they made it, free, for in many cases the Spaniards simply forced themselves on the unwilling natives.

Nor could the Spanish king claim title by just war. Since "not only have the *indios* never given reason by which war might be justly waged on them, but they on their part have had strong reasons to wage a very just war against the Spaniards."<sup>6</sup>

The Bishop refers to the grievances of the natives against the Spaniards in a letter to the king.<sup>7</sup> In this letter he tells how the chiefs of the villages of Tondo and Capaymisilo and other townships requested him to bring their complaints before the king. Among these were:

- a. the *alcaldes-mayor* and their officers inflict serious penalties for light offenses;
- b. they take the rice of the Indians at their own price, and afterwards sell it at a very high price: they do the same with other food articles and agricultural products;
- c. they oblige the *indios* to serve as oarsmen whenever they wish; after a month's expedition, [these *indios*] are asked to prepare to serve for another voyage, and are not paid for it at all — although in every village assessments are levied on the natives for the payment of those who go on such service. Or, if they are paid at all, it is very little and quite seldom.
- d. Because of these oppressive acts, many of their subjects have left Tondo and Capaymisilo causing a good deal of loss to the chiefs, [who] are obliged to pay the tribute of those who flee and die, and for their slaves

- and little boys;
- e. If they fail to make good the tribute, they are put in the stocks and flogged, or tied to posts;
  - f. Moreover, they do not dig for gold because the officials obliged them to pay a fifth; if they fail to report, their gold is confiscated, even if it is old gold; nor is this returned until after paying a heavy fine;
  - g. If they complain to the alcaldes-mayor, they are imprisoned and thrown into the stocks, and are charged with prison-fees.

Alonso Sanchez, whom the civil and ecclesiastical authorities in Manila commissioned to go to Spain in 1587 to bring the *Memorials* of the citizens and present them to the king, himself had an opinion on the temporal right of the king over the Philippines:

. . . neither pope nor king nor any other lord spiritual or temporal possesses dominion over lands and people he has never hitherto seen nor heard of; and if he possess neither dominion nor authority over them, it follows that he cannot give them man-made laws nor compel them to observe the natural or divine laws; nor, consequently, punish them because of any sin they might commit against any of the aforesaid laws.<sup>8</sup>

To the credit of the Spanish king, it must be mentioned that at least he had scruples after his first conversation with Sanchez and after reading the *Memorials*. He created a Royal Commission to examine the Philippine case, and to make recommendations. The Commission made these recommendations after a long and gruelling interview with Sanchez.

Thus in 1599, Philip ordered the then Spanish Governor General of the Philippines, Don Francisco Tello, "by the best and gentle methods possible, to compel the natives to render submission to your Majesty . . . for the greater peace of your royal conscience . . ." Tello reported that the method worked well in the Ilocos and the entire dis-

district of Manila, although it was not quite successful in Laguna and other places, where the natives requested for time to reconsider the royal will and make their reply. Even in Nueva Segovia things did not go quite so easily. Fray Juan de Medina reported that when it was announced to the people that the king desired them to accept him as their king, "the chiefs answered not a word." Upon the Bishop's inquiry if they understood the question, and whether they would reply, one of the natives rose to speak, but note the irony and sarcasm in his words: "We answer that we wish the king of España to be our king and sovereign, for he has sent Castilians to us, who are freeing us from the tyranny and dominion of our chiefs, as well as Fathers who aid us against the same Castilians and protect us from them."<sup>9</sup>

As the time Sanchez was in Spain in 1588, there were between 250,000 to 300,000 tribute-paying natives subject to the Crown. However, there were also over one million more who were still outside Spanish jurisdiction. When the Spaniards arrived, the natives were organized in small communities or barangays under petty chieftains. Because these barangays were constantly feuding with one another, it did not take long for the Spaniards to divide and conquer them.

The subjugation of the natives was often vehemently objected to by them. Thus a native *indio* the night before Juan de Salcedo sacked the village of Cainta, Rizal, climbed a tree and shouted at the top of his voice to the Spaniards: "Spaniards, what did our fathers do to you, or what did they owe you, that you now come to rob us?" And when the natives would not accept the proffered hand of friendship and built themselves fortifications to defend themselves — this was considered grounds for a just war, and they were either killed or imprisoned, their houses plundered and burned. This happened in Betis, Lubao in Pampanga, and in Papagan in the Visayas.

Before 1599, the usual way of getting the natives to submit was by a show of force. Either a salvo of guns was fired from the ship, ostensibly to greet the local king and his people, but really in order to psychologically unsettle them. This happened for instance at Butuan as well as in Cebu even as early as the time of Magellan. Or there was also another device used to calm the consciences of the invaders. It was called the *Requerimiento* or proclamation which the Spanish Commander was to

have read to the local chiefs through an interpreter. In brief, the Commander reminded the natives that God the Creator of heaven and earth had placed the whole world under the charge of one man, namely, St. Peter, so that he might be supreme lord of all men of the world. Now St. Peter and his successors had been recognized as rulers of all men, no matter what their race or religion may be. One of the successors of St. Peter had "donated these islands and mainland" to the king of Spain, as may be found in certain documents "which you may see if you wish to do so." Then he reminded them that many nations had accepted the missionaries sent by their Majesties and were now accepted vassals by the king of Spain. Then,

Finally, to the best of my ability, I ask and demand that you understand well what I have told you, and take reasonable amount of time to understand it and deliberate concerning it, and recognize the Church as the Lord and Superior of the whole world, and the Supreme Pontiff, the Pope, in its name, and the King and Queen, or Lords, in his place, as superiors and lords of these islands . . . by virtue of such donation, and that you consent and permit that these religious fathers declare and preach to you what has been said above.<sup>10</sup>

And he warned those unwilling to agree thus:

. . . I shall make war on you whenever and however I can and I will subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highnesses, and I will take your persons and those of your wives and children and make slaves of them and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command . . . and I will protest that the deaths and damages which shall come from this are your fault and not their Highnesses nor mine, nor that of those gentlemen who have come with me, and that I say this to you and make this requerimiento; I request the notary here present to give me his testimony in writing, and ask those present to be witnesses thereof.<sup>11</sup>

The *encomienda* was the next device employed to control the natives. After they had been cowed and rendered miserable, then the

*encomendero* would come with a number of Spanish friends, to the towns assigned to him by the Governor General, and he would also make this proclamation:

Understand that I am your master, for the Governor has given you to me. I will see to it that other Spaniards do you no wrong<sup>12</sup> . . .

Forthwith they proceeded to demand tribute, each one as much as he was able to extort.

What happened then to the rights of the natural lords of the land? Why should they be rendered without power and prestige in their own land by the *encomienda*? Is the Gospel meant to deprive people of their natural rights, or is it not intended to foster and secure these human rights? Let us listen to Bishop Benavides:

If his Majesty sends sufficient religious and priests, and the Bishops and Governor and the Audiencia and religious know how to handle matters, treating the indians well, and in particular those who are the natural lords, leaving to them what is in justice due them . . ., namely, the government of their towns, and giving orders that the soldiers and encomenderos and collectors of tribute do not oppress the indios, it will be very easy to attract these infidels to the obedience of his Majesty, even before they become Christians. <sup>13</sup>

The bishops concludes that this is the only way whereby the lords and vassals will voluntarily and freely desire to swear fidelity to his Majesty and his successors and also pay him tribute. In the Synod of Manila in 1582, the Fathers, among other statements made it very clear that where the Gospel is preached in a land of such good government, it was not necessary to take away any of its government and laws in order to plant the faith; especially if the people are loyal and true and so well adapted to the supernatural, and would not prevent the preaching of the Gospel, nor put obstacles to preachers, nor expel the faith once accepted, nor its ministers. To take away their government from such people as these, would be tyranny. "For in case of such people," adds

the Bishop, "the Gospel takes away nothing, but rather gives them what they did not have, and preserves and perfects them in what they have."<sup>14</sup>

For the Filipinos, though warlike in their free state, were peaceable once subjugated. Of the Tagalogs, at least, a Jesuit missionary wrote:

They are of a happy disposition, candid, loyal, simple, and sociable. They love to speak our language, even if they can only manage a few words. They have a lively intelligence and easily learn Christian doctrine and how to read and write in our alphabet; most of them read and write in their own.<sup>15</sup>

Had the Spaniards listened to the advice of Benavides, Spain would have established her temporal overlordship even in the south. Here, however, Spain met resistance from our brethren in Sulu and Maguindanao. For these peoples were more organized in polity and in trade, due to their fortunate links with Brunei, Indonesia and the Malay archipelago. Being excellent seamen, they easily became the recipients of the Muslim religion and culture which had been well established there before the coming of the Spaniards to the Philippines.

I venture to say that had the early Conquistadores been more human and delicate in the way they approached the Muslim south, the story of the Muslim-Christian relations over the centuries would have been much more felicitous. For the inhabitants of the south were of the same racial stock and culture as their cousins in the Bisayan and Luzon islands.

However, for the Spaniards, the Sulus and Maguindanaos were a different case. They were simply Moros — Moors — their adamant foe with whom they had struggled since time immemorial, and over whom they won signal triumph with the fall of Granada in 1492. Thus the wars of Spain against the Muslim south took on the color of a crusade. We shall now take a look at these wars which have been called the "Moro Wars."

Allow me then to place the "Moro Wars" in proper perspective. To do so, one must go back to Spain from the 8th to the 15th centuries. The Visigothic kings, unable to command the loyalty of their subjects, fell suddenly to the onslaughts of Arabs and Moors from North Africa

within a period of seven years (from 711 to 718). Centered in Cordoba, the Muslims ruled the south for eight centuries. However, through the combined efforts of the northern Spaniards and their allies, Cordoba was recaptured in 1236. Seville came next in 1248; finally after almost two centuries of bitter and intermittent fighting, under the joint forces of Ferdinand and Isabela, Granada fell in 1492. The fierceness and bitterness of this struggle by Spaniards may be gleaned from the quality of fighting men they produced, as come through in the story of *El Cid Campeador* of Castille. And when Granada fell, one could imagine the transports of joy and freedom which swept across the entire Iberian peninsula.

When Ferdinand Magellan landed in the Philippines in 1521, Granada was only a little over a generation past (29 years). When Legaspi came to Cebu in 1565, the memory of Granada was almost three generations old (to be exact 73 years old). But one could note that the chivalric spirit of the soldiers of España, who had successfully shaken off the Moorish yoke, was still alive; and the mention of followers of the Prophet close by must have made their blood boil with a desire to fight. Some of the soldiers and retainers of Legaspi and the other conquistadores must have carried memories of oppression and offended honor sustained by parents or grandparents from the hands of the Moorish overlords in the long centuries of domination. And these traumas would not heal in a matter of 73 years.

It appears like a trick of Divine Providence that the same religion which the Spaniards had fought against and triumphed over only three generations ago would suddenly pop up to challenge them, now no longer on Spanish soil, but in the islands of the Southeast Asian cyclades.

The aim of this review is to see the larger moral and spiritual or, if you will, religious implications or dimensions of these wars in the light of an ecumenical spirit. This paper will try as much as possible to judge the events and understand them from an objective viewpoint, that is, from the analysis of the happenings guided by solidly held and commonly accepted principles. Before we tackle the events themselves, it will be well to discuss the religious principles which we would like to use as a yardstick in assessing the meaning of the so-called Moro Wars.

## II. The Religious Principles

In trying to understand the religious dimension of the Moro Wars, I have to rely on principles in which the world religions, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism have a common consensus. I will use these as convenient pegs for our discussion. I am borrowing them from Dr. Friedrich Heiler.<sup>16</sup> Briefly these points are: First, that there is a transcendent reality called the holy, divine, the altogether Other, overarching and undergirding the whole colorful world of phenomena as "the reality of realities"; (*satasya satyam*); or the "one without a counterpart," *ekam advityam Upanishads*); or "the eternal truth" (*alhagg*) in Islamic Sufism: the *Tao* of ancient China; *logos* of ancient Greece; the *verbum* or Word of God in St. John. Various personified as Yahweh, Varuna, Ahura Mazda, Allah, Vishnu, Buddha, Kali, Kwan Yin, he is also imaged as ruler, father, mother, friend, savior, bridegroom or bride.

As a corollary to His transcendence, all agree that God's ways are not man's ways; "that we require his guidance and help to find our way back to him"; that many of our traditional and historical symbols and concepts of this Transcendent Being fall far short of His reality. And therefore, that there is constant need to re-examine our symbols, to update them so that as the Divine gradually leads mankind on to further conquests in the world of nature as well as of the world of the spirit, man will not be guilty of holding on to symbols which have become idols, because they have outlived their relevance and freshness. This does not, of course, imply that any religious faith, worthy of its salt should relinquish the fundamental and unique charism or gift of God given to their founder. For this charism or gift should remain unchanged through the vicissitudes of change, and the followers of His faith should constantly go back to this fundamental gift or charism, if it is to be preserved intact even in this distant day. For what was vouchsafed by heaven to the founder comes from God, is a manifestation of His holiness and reality. And this remain so long as man is man.

Second point of common consensus, is the fact that this Reality while transcendent is also immanent, penetrating the world through and through, especially the heart of man. For man's spirit is the temple of the divine spirit, St. Paul tells us in I Cor. 3, 16; and the Qur'an says that Allah is nearer than our very pulse or jugular vein (50:16); and St. Augustine speaks of God as "*intimior intimo meo*," that is, "more inward than my innermost being" (Confessions III, 6); the *atman* is, according to the mystics of ancient India, one with Brahman.

As a corollary again, God is not only the God of nature, but also of the human will and heart; and therefore also of the decision of man and the fruits of that decision; namely, culture, language, art, religion, morality, conscience, and even violence or conflicts, and the legalized violence we call war. Indeed, He is the God, as well, of time and history during which these two are made and man's freedom unfolds.

Third, this Reality is for man the highest good, the highest truth, righteousness, goodness, beauty, indeed beyond goodness and beauty, the "supergood," the "superbeautiful." There is nothing in the world of nature and of spirit that can compare with Him.

Fourth, this divine Reality is the highest kind of love which reveals itself to man in man. He is mercy, grace, compassion. And man can return His offer of love only by loving Him in an unrestricted and total manner. Only in this way, may man, as far as he is humanly capable, be able to make a return for God's ultimate love.

Fifth, the way to Him is through repentance, self-denial, prayer which can be vocal, contemplation, or silent prayer. And when the religious man prays, he asks of God "nothing but God himself," as St. Augustine said; prayer is not so much man's ascent to God, as God revealing himself in the ground of man's heart. The greatest Islamic mystic-poet, Dschelal-ed-din Rumi tells us of a man who prayed, and who began to doubt because he received no answer from God. Then this message came from Allah: "Your cry 'O God' is my cry 'I am here' — in a single cry O 'God' are a hundred answers 'Here I am'." And Pascal puts this line in God's mouth: "You would not seek Me if you had not already found Me." God the eternal is Himself present in the spirit of man as its secret ground, being and spark.

Sixth: the way to God is the love of one's neighbor, even of one's

enemy. And this is so because if God is in the heart of man as the ground of man's own being, and, if love is the way to God, then the love of man is the way to God. Only if man loves his fellowmen, even his enemies, can he love God without measure, in return for God's own overwhelming love for man. Thus, man is not only on the way to God; he is the way to God. This is also true if we consider that man is God's image in that man has been gifted by God not only with intelligence, whereby man is present to himself through the act of reflective knowledge, but also with the gift of freedom, so that none of the goods of this world can become the object of man's unrestricted love, save the one and only Supergood and Superbeautiful. And if man loves man, the image of God, he is on the way to loving the Original, so long as the image, through its right relations with the Original, remains truly an image, a mirror, as it were, through which man can see the divine Original.

It is clear, then, that the greatest of the commandments of God is love God, and in loving God, to love one's neighbor, even one's enemy, because he, too, is a neighbor since God loves him. And it is in this love of God for all men, without discrimination that all men are neighbors. Real love, then, the love whereby man can truly answer the love of God, is a double movement: towards the neighbor and towards God, or towards God and towards the neighbor. For, as St. John admonishes the religious man, "If you say you love God whom you cannot see, and hate your brother whom you see — you are telling a lie."

If love for neighbor is the measure of our love for God, then it is important that we should examine the Moro Wars under the light of this command to love God by loving our neighbor.

If to love God is to submit ourselves fully to his Will (the badge of true Islam), and if to do his will is to give him his due, so also if we submit ourselves to Allah in obeying his will that we should love our neighbor, it appears that the first badge of true obedience is to give to our neighbor his due. In other words, to be just is an essential ingredient of effective love for my fellow creature. It is in this light, then, that I invite you to examine with me the first phase of the Moro Wars. We would like to investigate how well or ill was the injunction of brotherly love kept by both protagonists.

On the one hand, we have the Muslim Filipinos with their Malay allies, as well as the other European nations which had an interest in the spice trade in Southeast Asia, particularly the Dutch and the English; on the other, we have the Spaniards and their native allies, particularly the Bisayans, Tagalogs and Pampangos who composed their militia men, built and manned their ships, fought their wars, as well as the other mountain tribes who were non-Muslims and who, once subjugated, remained loyal to Spain. Not to be omitted will be the other great European power which had been in Southeast Asia even before the Spaniards, I mean the Portuguese. For when Philip II became king of Portugal in 1580, Portugal and Spain were one.

### III. The Moro Wars — First Phase, from 1565 to 1685.

When Legaspi sailed into Philippine waters in 1565, there was already a strong political power to reckon with in the south, and this power was already having its presence felt in the north. This was not the Portuguese. It was the Bornean principality which was doubly strong because of its close connections with the Sulu Sultanate centered in Jolo. There were actually close economic and social ties between Manila and Brunei. The first encounter between Spain and Brunei occurred in March 1565. A Bornean trading vessel was captured and 20 Borneans were killed, the Spaniards sustaining the loss of only one life. Again in 1569, somewhere in Bisayan waters the Spaniards defeated 20 vessels manned by Borneans and Sulus. Result: four Bornean vessels were lost, and the spoils divided between the Spaniards and their Bisayan allies.<sup>17</sup>

#### *Section I: Governor Sande's Wars*

Again in 1574 there were reports that the Borneans, with the support of their relatives in Manila and Tondo, were preparing a fleet of 100 galleys, 100 smaller vessels, and 7000 warriors to attack Manila. Somehow this report did not materialize. Then an excellent opportunity for Spain to vent its venom on Borneo came when, early in 1578,

Pangiran Buong Manis whose title was Pangiran Sri Lela visited the Spaniards in Manila asking for help against his brother Serf-ur-Rajal who, he claimed, had usurped the throne of Brunei. If the Spaniards helped him, he promised to accept Spanish sovereignty. Thus on March 4, 1578, Gov. Gen. Francisco de Sande sailed for Brunei with 40 vessels, 400 Spanish soldiers, and 300 Bornean followers of Pangiran Sri Lela. It took them 30 days to negotiate the trip to the mouth of Brunei River. After a naval encounter, they defeated the Brunei fleet, and Serf-ur-Rejal, together with his aged father, Abdul Kahor, retired to the interior.

Sande then moved up to the village, which was the capital of the king of Brunei, and took possession of the house of the king, containing well-furnished pieces of artillery, versos, cannons and culverins and other weapons. He went to the mosque, and ordered the religious paraphernalia, including the bathing trough which the Borneans claimed contained holy water that would assure heaven for the bather. Then he had a stockade built and lodgings prepared for him and the Spaniards. He declared that he was taking possession of these lands and property in the name of the King of Spain.<sup>18</sup>

Before actually investing the town of Brunei, however, Sande had sent two letters to the King of Brunei, which were entrusted by the messengers (six Moors, one Tondo, and five Balayan) to two chiefs, Magat and Magatchina who, although under the employ of the King of Brunei, were themselves inhabitants of Balayan, Batangas.<sup>19</sup>

In his letter, Sande made these charges against the King of Brunei:

1. Inciting natives to rebel against Spain and sending spies to Cebu and other islands;
2. Intimidating and detaining native traders from the Philippines, who were subjects to the King of Spain;
3. Withholding properties belonging to members of the old aristocracy in Manila, who had since become Spanish subjects and therefore worthy of being protected by Spanish government;
4. Sending Muslim preachers to any part of the Philippines (Sande also ordered him not to send the same to any part of his own domain in Borneo);
5. Collecting tribute from natives of Spanish-held territories in the

Philippines, a violation of the sole right of the Spanish king as sovereign of these lands.<sup>20</sup>

However, in 1581, Serf ur-Rijal regained power and Spain sent another fleet. But the results were inconsequential, because Pangiran Sri Lela was killed by his rival's followers.

What was the result of the Spanish ventures in Brunei, after this turn of events? I borrow an observation from Dr. Majul:

Plans to start a permanent colony in Brunei or somewhere else in the island of Borneo never materialized. Thus, from 1581 onwards, the Spaniards did not exercise any significant political influence over Brunei.<sup>21</sup>

The significance of the Brunei expedition lies in the assumptions behind the undertaking: once Brunei is demobilized it would be easier for Spain to reduce its ally, Sulu, into a tribute state, to pacify the Maguindanao area, to require its paramount chiefs to pay tribute, and to expect Christian missionaries, rather than to allow Islam to be preached.<sup>22</sup>

As has been mentioned above, the Manila synod condemned the action of Gov. Sande against the Sultan of Brunei. It categorically stated that the war was quite unjust for these reasons: Sande was interfering in the affairs of another sovereign nation beyond the frontiers of the political limits of Spain; besides, he did not have the explicit approval of the King of Spain; it seems too that Sande sided with someone who was evidently not the rightful heir to the throne, as is clear from the fact that the old King of Brunei was on the side of Serf ur-Rijal, and not on the side of Pangiran Sri Lela; the presence of the Spanish fleet in the River of Brunei, and the attack it made on the capital was unprovoked and was an act of unjust aggression. So were his deeds and those of his soldiers when they entered the mosque, took away the utensils and objects held sacred by the people. Sande found fault with the King of Brunei for sending Muslim missionaries to the Philippines and forbade him to do so in the future, and commanded him to allow Christian missionaries to come and preach the Gospel. This was indeed discriminatory and unjust. He also accused him of sending spies to Cebu and other islands. Sande did not realize that there were political and other ties binding Borneo and the islands of the Philippines long before the

Spaniards came. Did Spaniards have the right to put an end to these age-old ties? Clearly, there was lack of brotherly love towards the King and people of Brunei on the part of Sande.

Thus, the Synod declared that Sande and all soldiers, Spaniards and natives, who partook of the expedition and the spoils, were bound to make restitution to the people of Brunei.

### *Section II. The Expeditions of Esteban de Figueroa*

In June 1578, Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa was sent by Gov. Sande to Jolo in order to extract from the Sultan who, most probably, according to Majul, was Pangirin Bundiman, brother-in-law to Serf ur-Rijal. However, Sande identified him as Rajah Ilo from Brunei, who had fought on the side of the old Brunei King and had fled into the interior with him. At first Rajah Ilo resisted Figueroa, but when captured he agreed to pay tribute and to become a vassal of Spain. He paid 12 pearls and some gold. He also laid claims to other Sulu islands like Tawi-tawi, Taguima (Basilan), Samboanga and Cavite in western Mindanao.<sup>2 3</sup>

From his victories in Jolo, Figueroa proceeded to the Pulangi River in search of Datu Dimasankay of Magindanao, the paramount datu of the River. Finding himself ill-provided, however, Figueroa had to return to Brunei and finally to Arevalo. In March 1577, another expedition led by Capt. Gabriel de Rivera went to contact Dimasangkay to warn him not to accept Muslim preachers, to pay tribute, to inform him that the Brunei mosque had been burnt, and to find out if he had contact with the Moluccas. But again Dimasangkay was nowhere to be found. Rivera had to return to Cavite in western Mindanao and finally to Cebu.

This failure in communication gave the Spaniards an excuse once again to resume hostilities against the Maguindanao. In 1591, the Spanish government decided to colonize Mindanao. A contract was struck between the government and Capt. Figueroa. His task was to purify Mindanao and to establish a colony in the Pulangi area. All these

were to be undertaken via his own personal funds. In return, the government promised to designate him Governor of Mindanao, and this position would become hereditary.

Let us look into the motives for this decision to colonize Mindanao. First because Mindanao is fertile and rich to resources; second, the Mindanao ruler had blasphemed sacred objects; third, he has permitted Bornean preachers in his capital and Ternateans who knew warfare; fourth, he has forcibly imposed tribute to natives who are subjects of the King of Spain; and fifth, with peace in Mindanao, Spain could exact obedience from Brunei, Sulu and Java.

So, on April 1, 1596, Figueroa left for Mindanao with 50 vessels of various sizes, 214 Spaniards and 1500 natives. After three weeks they reached the mouth of Pulangi. At that time the most powerful datu of the Magindanao confederacy was Datu Silongan of Bwayan. Informed that Silongan had taken a strong stand at a Magindanao town, which stood on a hill and was easy to fortify and defend, Figueroa sent a squadron under his second-in-command, Juan de Jara, to reconnoiter. Impatient with the delay, Figueroa landed and was soon cut down by emissaries of Silongan who ambushed him. His second-in-command, Juan de Jara, took over and established a fort of Tampakan, a place between Magindanao and Bwayan. But because de Jara did not manage affairs well, the Spanish government employee, Juan Ronquillo, was sent to relieve him. Thus the private enterprise begun by Figueroa was taken over by the government. In the meantime, Datu Dimasankay died and his younger brother, Bwisan, assumed office as the chief of Magindanao. A son of Dimasankay was designated Rajah Muda or heir apparent to the chieftainship of both Magindanao and Bwayan. Then Datu Silongan and his allies attacked Tampakan while Datu Bwisan went to seek Ternatean help. The Ternateans came in a fleet with 800 soldiers under the command of Katchil Baba, uncle of the Sultan of Ternate. They built a cotta near Tampakan which the Spaniards demolished, killing many Ternateans, including Katchil Baba.

To seal the alliance with Ternate, Datu Bwisan arranged a marriage between the Rajah Muda and the sister of the Sultan of Ternate, Said Din Berkat. Meantime, the Spaniards had befriended the Rajah Muda and had won his sympathy. They then proposed instead that he marry

the sister of the Datu of Tampakan who had accepted Spanish sovereignty. But this proposal failed because it was opposed by both Datu Bwisan and Datu Silongan.

Because of the uneasy situation in the Magindanao basin, and also because of the difficulty of communication and securing supplies, Ronquillo proposed and was granted permission to remove the garrison from Tampakan, to La Caldera, a few miles from Zamboangan. This new fort was used to intimidate Muslims from Sulu and Brunei. Eventually, however, because the Ternateans came to the aid of the Magindanao Confederacy, this fort also had to be abandoned. It was necessary for the Ternateans to offset Spanish influence in Magindanao and Bwayan, since they foresaw that a Spanish conquest of these two outposts could have made them stepping stones for the conquest of the Moluccas. On the other hand, Ronquillo saw the need to break the strong alliance between Magindanao, Bwayan and Ternate for the security of the Spanish domains. In a letter to Gov. Francisco Tello, he says: "[It is in the best interest of Spain that the Maguindanao] break the peace and confederation made with the people of Ternate, and must not admit the latter into their country."<sup>24</sup>

How did the Muslim principalities regard all these developments: the exacting of tribute, the building of the forts in Tampakan and La Caldera, the prohibition to accept Muslim preachers, and the expressed intention to Christianize them? Of course they say that this meant the end of their independence and the loss of their traditional rights to tribute from Muslim and non-Muslim tribes. Ronquillo himself had noted that the Muslim chiefs, unlike those in Luzon, were used to "power and sovereignty," with some of them collecting as much as 5 to 6 thousand tributes.

Ronquillo's return to Manila and the abandonment of Tampakan and La Caldera may have made the Spaniards think that the Muslims had weakened and no longer posed a threat. "Actually after this departure, in the face of common danger, the Muslims pooled their resources

not only for the defense but also for the offensive against Spanish-held settlements in other parts of the Philippines."<sup>25</sup> And in this they were greatly aided by others who took heart from the successes of the Muslims against the Spaniards, namely, the Caragans and the Camucones or Orang Tedong. We shall see more of this below.

Again the question has to be raised whether the Spaniards were justified in sending Figueroa to colonize Mindanao on the strength of the reasons given. An honest assessment of these reasons cannot but lead one to conclude that the economic and political or colonial considerations far outweighed the religious and spiritual motivation. The Spaniards wanted Mindanao because it was rich in resources (economic), and also because it could serve as a base for military operations against the Moluccas (colonial and economic). Also, they desired to collect tribute from the non-Muslims and Muslims, once these people were subjugated. The prohibition imposed on the Sulus against receiving Bornean teachers and the Magindanaos against accepting Ternatean preachers was again largely economic, for the teaching of Islam to these two groups would have consolidated their allegiance to the Muslim datus and sultans, and thus would render them unwilling subjects of the Spanish King. By reason of geographical propinquity and racial and cultural affinities, the Maguindanaos and the Suluans had all the rights to communicate freely with their neighbors to the south. Besides, these links had been forged even before the coming of Spain to the Philippines. It certainly must have struck the native leaders of Sulu and Magindanao that Spain was an intruder, and had absolutely no right to forbid them from keeping their time-honored relationships in trade, commerce and culture and religion. And it was but right that whenever Spain would go after them to get them to accept her terms, the leaders were nowhere to be found.

It seems that this Figueroa campaign was contrary to the demands of brotherly love. By agreeing to make Figueroa the Governor of Mindanao, and to make this position hereditary, Spain was scraping off the age-long hegemony of the local leadership and substituting its own form of government. And she could impose herself because of the louder bark of her cannons and guns. Is it any wonder, then, that the next century was to be heralded in by alarums of wars and troubles in Min-

danao and the Visayas? The suppression of the garrison at La Caldera gave the Muslims new heart.

In October 1603, the Magindanao attacked in great numbers the mission station at Dulac, on the east coast of Leyte. It was there that Fr. Melchor Hurtado, S.J., was captured by Bwisan. Then the Muslims proceeded to Palo, burning it down on Nov. 1, 1603. At about the same time, the Caragas approached the west coast of Leyte with 18 boats. They attacked Baybay and Ormoc, killed people and took prisoners. In 1605 the Caragas were punished with a war expedition. But they struck again in 1609 together with the Maguindanaos. They sacked Dulac once again. This obligated Gov. Juan de la Silva to commission Capt. Juan de la Vega to establish a garrison in Tandag to hold back the Caragas.

Love begets love; and hate begets hate. So the retaliatory measures which filled the early part of the 17th century between the Spaniards on the one hand and the Magindanaos, the Sulus and the Caragas on the other, were parade specimens of the validity of this universal truth. If the Muslims and the Caragas were cruel and unscrupulous in their raids, so were the Spaniards and their native allies.

An expedition composed of three companies of Spanish soldiers set out in 1614 against the Caragas. When they reached there, they burned houses, destroyed crops in the fields, and took many Caragas prisoners to serve as galley-slaves. They also liberated some 700 prisoners who had been taken by the Caragas in their previous raids in the Visayas.

To love one's neighbor, even one's enemies, is an imperative of itself. Because only love can allow life to flourish. To act otherwise is to keep life in constant peril, to stifle it from growing, and thereby make life less human.

Even the religious and spiritual motivations of Spain were equally tainted with lack of love. For when it came to allowing the other religion to flourish, Spain was intolerant. It would not allow others to co-exist with Christianity. If the Muslims were intransigent in this regard, so were the Spaniards. Perhaps this could be viewed again in the perspective of the long drawn-out fight between Christianity and Islam in the Spanish south, from the eighth to the 15th centuries.

However, the Spaniards, especially the missionaries who had been

captured and lived with the Muslims, and had observed them very closely, were gifted with an insight into the validity of their own religious faith. Let us listen to Fr. M.Hurtado who passed judgment on the Muslims. Of course, he began by saying that the beliefs of the Magindanaos were false and their rites and rubrics vain. But he added:

They give to these [i.e., the rites and rubrics] a seriousness of attention which we ordinarily fail to give to those of our true religion. An inspector-general who had been sent from Johore reprimanded the young men because when they were at worship in their mosque (a worship performed after their custom with many prostrations and genuflections and bows of the head towards the west), they did it with little reverence, turning their faces this way and that, in a way that detracted from the attention and respect with which they ought to address God. For this reason, when the hour of worship sounded, even a slave was permitted to take his master by the shoulders and turn him toward the west. And even if the rajah himself were to pass by, he should get no attention from them. They say of a brother of Sirongan . . . that one day while performing this vain worship he was bitten by a poisonous centipede. It was a painful bite, but it moved him a little as though he were a piece of stone. Only after he had finished his prayer did he put his hand inside his clothes; for, he said, he considered it a lack of reverence to scratch oneself while speaking with God.<sup>26</sup>

### *Section III: The Conquest of Governor General Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera*

By the early part of the seventeenth century, Pedro Bravo de Acuña, as mentioned above, was Governor General of the Philippines. In 1603, the Maguindanaos attacked the mission station of Dulac, in eastern Leyte. Among those taken captives was Father Melchor Hurtado who was imprisoned by Silongan for one full year. At that time

there was a Confederacy in Maguindanao: between Bwisan, the chief of Maguindanao, and Silongan, the chieftain of Bwayan. In a previous encounter with the Spaniards under the command of Juan Ronquillo, Bwisan had lost his swivel gun which had been captured by Ronquillo.<sup>27</sup>

The Spanish authorities wanted to make peace with the Maguindanao chieftains in the hope that this would pave the way to the conquest of the Moluccas. They sent emissaries to the Maguindanao Confederacy suing for peace. The following were the terms laid down by Governor Acuña:<sup>28</sup>

1. Mutual return of captives;
2. Renunciation of war as an instrument of policy;
3. Offensive and defensive alliance with Spaniards against the Sultan of Ternate;
4. Freedom to preach Christianity among Maguindanaos and freedom of Maguindanaos who desire it to become Christians;
5. The Spanish government to recognize Silongan as lord paramount of the Great River.

This last term was calculated to sow discord among the Maguindanao princes.

Bwisan yielded to Silongan and gave up Hurtado. He accepted the offered terms except the one concerning the sultan of Ternate. Hurtado was released on Sept. 1604. Hardly was he back in Manila when Acuña requested him to return to Maguindanao as ambassador, to renew the peace terms, and to make sure the Maguindanao princes would not help their ancient ally, the Sultan of Ternate.

Hurtado was met at the mouth of the Rio Grande by the Rajah Mura and Bwisan, and they escorted him to Bwayan where Silongan awaited him. Hurtado told the princes the truth, namely, that the Spaniards wanted to have peace with the Maguindanaos, and that the governor was really going to attack Ternate. The princes objected. Acuña's fleet came as announced. The governor wanted to confer with the princes, but they would not appear; nor would they agree to send down Hurtado at the request of Acuña. The situation was tense, and the swivel gun which was intended for delivery to Bwisan was turned around and pointed at the coastland. However, Acuña did not attack.

His fleet disappeared and proceeded to Moluccas, where his campaign proved victorious.<sup>29</sup> At this time, the princes sought for peace and sent Hurtado to Manila as their ambassador to sue for peace. However, things did not fall in the way they were planned. Acuña died soon after Hurtado arrived back in Maguindano. Hurtado had to return again to Manila without accomplishing much by way of conciliation. In 1609, new Governor General, Don Rodrigo de Vivere, sent to Mindanao Maestro de Campo Juan Juarez Gallinato and appointed Fr. Pascual de Acuña chaplain of the Maestro. The mission did not accomplish anything because, soon after, the Dutch once again created trouble for the Spaniards in the Philippines.

The Muslim triumvirate of Mindanao — Silongan of Maguindanao, Rajah Mura of Jolo, and the lord of Ternate—got the drubbing of their lives in 1610 at the hands of the Sultan of Brunei. Because of this debacle, they left the Visayas at peace for three successive years until 1613, when a new leader (Kudrat) came with his caracoas. This time he was supported by the Caragans who took heart from the last victories of the triumvirate against the Spaniards. However, the ensuing raids of the combined Muslims and Caragans and the retaliatory measures taken by the Spaniards and their native allies were ended, temporarily, with the establishment in 1614 of a Spanish fort of Tandag and the stationery garrison there, as mentioned above. This peace and order was uneasy, however. In addition to the internal troubles there were external ones, especially from the Dutch who had taken the Moluccas from the Portuguese in 1640.<sup>30</sup>

In the meantime, the old Muslim confederacy, which had been loose and ineffective since its defeat by the Sultan of Brunei in 1610, was reuniting and reforming into an even stronger force, developing in no time into a Sultanate — under Bwisan's son, Kechil Capitwan Kudrat.<sup>31</sup>

Kudrat (Corralat to the Spaniards) was a match in courage, strategy, foresight, speed and dispatch to the best of Spain's conquistadores. It also took the last of them, Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera,

to deliver a telling blow to this perhaps greatest of native warriors. Kudrat meanwhile was the acknowledged leader of the upper and lower Pulanui regions. He was acceptable to the Sultan of Jolo, and was even then making his influence felt in the region around the Lake of Lanao and even as far north as Butuan in Agusan and Cagiang in Misamis. His ascendancy had been preceded by a series of raids mounted by the Moros against the Visayas and some towns of southern Luzon and even as far north as Cavite, by the Sulus under Datu Ache and by the Camucos or Orang Tedong from Brunei. Within a period of ten years from 1625 to 1635, there were five major raids; three Jesuit missionaries had lost their lives and many other religious like the Recollects had their mission churches sacked and burned, their sacred images, chalices and other sacred paraphernalia stolen and desecrated, and the Christian communities scattered or captured.<sup>32</sup>

These raids eventually led to the establishment of the Fort at Samboangan called Fort Nuestra Señora del Pilar on June 23, 1635, in order to contain the expeditions from the south. It was erected by the acting Governor General Juan Cerezo de Salamanca at the proposal of the Jesuit provincial, Rev. Father Juan de Bueras. But the fort was later abandoned, when it was found too expensive to maintain and the sluggish seacrafts of the Spanish garrison ineffective against the swift Moro vintas. Later on, however, it was rebuilt and has lasted even today.

A couple of incidents at this juncture bears retelling because they highlight the violations of brotherly love on the part of both Christian and Muslim. On April 1636, a certain Mindanao chief, Tagal by name, obtained Kudrat's blessing to go on a raid. He had to go alone when both the chiefs of Taguima and Basilan excused themselves. With four large joangas and three smaller vessels, Tagal plundered for eight months the islands of Cuyo and Calamianes and the coastal communities of Mindoro. "Having seized a chalice, with the patent that belonged to it, they used the latter for a plate for buyos and the chalice to spit in."<sup>33</sup>

Heavily laden with booty, Tagal did not pass between Basilan and Jolo, but chose to sail before the fort of Samboangan. A Lutao sighted them, and vessels were sent in pursuit. It was customary for Maguinda-

naos returning home victorious to drop anchor at a point off Samboangan called Punta de Flechas or "Arrow's Point." There a hill whose sides were of soft stone became the target for their bamboo lances which they had hardened by fire. The ritual was a kind of thanksgiving offering to the spirits in that hill.

The vessels in pursuit were commanded by Sargento-Mayor Nicolas Gonzales. Caught unaware, the Moros were easily overtaken. After an exchange of fires, their ships were boarded and captured. Of their four large vessels, only one escaped. Many Christian captives were rescued, and the booty, including sacred vessels and garments, were recovered. About three hundred Maguindanaos were either cut off or drowned as they escaped. The Spanish chronicler tells us that:

In the middle of the night a strange thing happened, almost prophetic of the misfortune to those Moros, and apparently a presage of their destruction. There was an earthquake, so sudden and so terrible, that it was plainly felt upon the sea; and a rumbling which sounded as if some aperture of hell were opening. Our terrified soldiers armed themselves with rosaries and agnus dei's and relics commending themselves to our Lord. During this earthquake the hill where they superstitiously shot their arrows fell to the sea.<sup>34</sup>

Soon after the incident on La Punta de Flechas, Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera was at Samboangan preparing to attack Cachil Kudrat in his chief village called Lamitan. While thus awaiting the time for action, Fr. Marcelo Francisco Mastrili, Corcuera's Jesuit chaplain, wrote his Father Provincial how Corcuera had ordered him to preach in the evening to the soldiers "on the reverence and devotion to be observed in church, in the presence of so great a Majesty (the Blessed Sacrament)." He continues:

This I did to the best of my ability, at the end inspiring the soldiers for the campaign, and inciting them to battle by showing them, painted on canvas, a figure of Christ, whose feet and right arm the Moros had cut off; in the middle of it they had made a large hole, using the cloth as a *chinina* or a small mantle. This a Moro actual-

ly wore, and they killed him while he had it on, the day when Nicolas Gonzales captured the caracoas.

This sacred mantle, Mastrili reports, had been received by Fr. Belin the Rector of Samboangan, who had given it to Corcuera and Corcuera in turn had entrusted it to Mastrili, who continues thus:

When I showed this image to the soldiers, and exhorted them to avenge with arms the injuries of the Holy Christ such were the tears, and so great was the tender devotion and holy desire for vengeance with which they were fired, that (as they afterward told me) they would, upon leaving the Church, have been willing to offer battle with all the world (against them). The effects were very marked and much tenderness of feeling were displayed, so that at last it was openly said that the mother who had no sons in this glorious enterprise was very unfortunante.<sup>3 5</sup>

Corcuera succeeded in defeating Kudrat in Ylihan, his well fortified redoubt. Kudrat fled wounded in one arm, his followers fleeing with him, leaving behind his child and wife, who hurled herself over a precipice.<sup>3 6</sup> Don Sebastian returned to Manila and was given a hero's welcome. Rizal at the Ateneo Municipal together with his classmates composed poems in Spanish celebrating the event. For a while, the fortunes of war seemed weighted in favor of Spain.

But no for long. With the turn of the tide, Corcuera was repudiated and ended his life a miserable man. His successor Governor Don Diego Fajardo sent Fr. Alejandro Lopez on June 24, 1645 to seek peace with the Sultans of Maguindanao and Sulu. Fajardo was convinced that Spain could not defend the Philippines against the Dutch, hence this move. De la Costa details the terms of this treaty:

1) Perpetual friendship and alliance, defensive and offensive, were established between Kudrat and his successors, and Philip IV, king of Spain and his successors. In case of conflict, arbitration was to be employed;

2) Captives and spoils during raids were to be divided equally between them; and

3) Spain recognized, as vassals of Kudrat, the inhabitants of the

territory of the Iho river in the interior, and the middle of the Bay of Tagalook to the Sibuguey River.<sup>37</sup>

This was a great event. Peace seemed to have settled on the island of Mindanao at last. While the festivities were on at Simuai, the Dutch landed a force in June 1645 in Jolo, at the invitation of Prince Salicula.<sup>38</sup>

Soon after, in 1653, Fajardo was succeeded by Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara. Fr. Lopez was again sent to Kudrat, with Father Montiel as companion, to sue for peace. This mission ended in tragedy for the two priests. At Balatami's home in Bwayan, Lopez and Montiel were killed with a lance and a kampilan.<sup>39</sup>

After this incident, a big war followed between Spain and Kudrat. Seeing the impotence of Spain, especially with the constant shadow of Holland nearby, Balatami, Kudrat's successor in leadership, went on a raiding expedition in 1656, going by the far side of Basilan to Marinduque and Mindoro. Emboldened by these moves, the Sulus followed suit under Salicula and raided the Bisayas, taking 1000 captives. The Spaniards retaliated weakly. The Sulus wrought havoc on the islands of Bohol, Leyte, Samar, and Masbate and the Luzon coast, even as far as Manila Bay.<sup>40</sup>

And so the fortunes of war shifted, now favoring one side, now the other. Thus the three sections of the first phase of the Moro wars ended. Unresolved. The fights and the hurts were destined to remain even to this day.

It is abundantly clear, even from this skimpy sketch of the events in the Moro Wars from 1637 onwards, that the same lack of love between the protagonists prevailed. Worse, the spirit of revenge and hate found on both sides always came under the mask of religious fervor. Consequently, there could be no end to it. Nothing could be harder to unmask than hatred parading as religion. Mastrili holding up the painted figure of the mutilated Christ to arouse Christian soldiers against the Moros was no more religious than Kudrat writing to the Sultan of Jolo justifying the lance thrust through the heart of Lopez and Montiel on the plea that the two priests were trying to make Christians out of him and his people.<sup>41</sup> No matter what the surface reason, it was hate that lay at the bottom.

It was and is therefore imperative that this hatred must be exposed and excised. Only then can a fresh start towards love become possible.

Love is possible only when the parties who love accept reality, and reality is not simple. It is very complex and many-layered. If love is to reign among Muslim and Christian Filipinos, here are some practical suggestions:

First, there is a need to accept our historical situation: the fact that Islam had come to the Philippines prior to Christianity and made adherents of our brothers in the South, as well as the fact that Christianity was brought into the Philippines by Spanish missionaries accompanied by the security of armed soldiers and all that these facts implied.

Second, there is also a need to accept the fact that because of the geographical vulnerability of Bisayas and Luzon to Spanish influence, they could not resist for long the creeping power of the Spaniard. Two factors helped this come about: one, the inherent weakness of the early social and political organization, the barangay, and, two, because the Bisayas and Luzon did not have the support of powerful and well organized neighbors near enough to come to their aid against Spain.

Third, we must accept the fact that one's religious faith, because it is also the product of training and imperceptible indoctrination, gradually becomes inured into one's total psyche or personality, so that it eventually becomes second nature and cannot be easily dislodged.

Fourth, the fact too must be admitted that Muslim and Christian Filipinos must mutually accept the total person of his brother if he must love him. This total acceptance of the person requires that they allow each other to believe as each wants, to develop his own culture and personality the way he has decided to. Also, each must refrain from doing anything to manipulate, much less to possess the other, but must rejoice that his brother is fully and genuinely himself.

In the practical order, this means respecting the feelings and sensibilities of other people. It means, therefore, allowing—even helping—the Christian to participate in his religion and its observances, and the Muslim to do likewise. It also includes not only awareness of but sympathy for each other's religious convictions and observances: the Ramadhan and the various Muslim holidays; the Christmas, Lenten and Easter holidays. This requires also avoiding any sense of superiority of

the one over the other, eschewing ridicule, and finally, laying aside the desire to convert the other. The mutual attitude, rather, would be to allow each other to become more and more himself, be he Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, or Pagan.

If there must be a Christian mission, this should be understood as a mandate to witness to true humanity for each other, to help bring out the best in each. For in so witnessing one's own humanity is not diminished; rather, it is enriched because he is open to Being, to Truth, to Goodness, to Beauty, to Unselfishness, to Generosity, to Friendship, to Justice, to Love. Using terms of modern philosophers, to accept the other means to take him as a subject, not an object; to accept the person as a world-in-himself whose experiences are uniquely his own, despite the fact that he also belongs to a wider community with its memories and its past, its experiences, aspirations and dreams. And, it might be added, despite the fact that these dreams and memories must be remembered if any one, Muslim or Christian, is to remain human and to grow in humanity.

Finally to accept the other person means also to accept the fact that there are many events, situations, turns and twists of fortune that one cannot rationalize, that life is a mystery. It is to have the humility to realize that man is limited, that he is neither God nor Allah, that he cannot, however developed and advanced he may be, stop the earthquake, old age and death, but that he can at least help to bring about understanding, friendship and mutual acceptance despite differences, by practicing justice and by loving his brother.

These, I submit, are the religious dimensions that we can glean from a rapid narration of the first phase of the Moro Wars.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf. **Muslims in the Philippines** (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), esp. pp. 107 to 168; 191 to 248; 283 to 316.

<sup>2</sup> This is the opinion of Juan Gines de Sepulveda based on the Aristotelian Concept of Natural Slavery in a book titled **Democrates Segundo**, ed. Angel Losada, quoted in **The Catholic Church in the Philippines**, Ed. John N. Schumacher, S.J. (Loyola School of Theology, 1970), p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> H. de la Costa, **The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 93.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 94.

<sup>5</sup> See Treaties of Bishop Salazar as quoted in Jesus Aragon, **Ideas Juridico-Teologicas de los Religiosos de Filipinas en el Siglo XVI**, pp. 165-169; cf. Schumacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>6</sup> Jesus Gayo Aragon; Schumacher, *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson, **The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898**, Vol. 5 (Cleveland, Ohio: A. H. Clark Co., 1903-1909), pp. 189-191.

<sup>8</sup> Colin-Pastells I, 351, in de la Costa *op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>9</sup> Juan de Medina, O.S.A., "Historia de la orden de S. Agustin," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 23, pp. 253-254.

<sup>10</sup> Juan Manzano-Manzao, **La incorporacion de las Indias a la Corona de Castilla**, pp. 43-56, in Schumacher, pp. 8-9.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> from "Memoria of Fray Diego de Herrera to the King" (1573?) in H. de la Costa, **Readings in Philippine History**, pp. 22-23.

<sup>13</sup> Treatise of Benavides, quoted in Gayo Aragon, p. 189; cf. Schumacher, *op. cit.* p. 50.

<sup>14</sup> "Suma de una Junta que se hizo a manera de Concilio el año de 1582," **Filipiniana Sacra** (1969), pp. 436-437, cf. Schumacher, *op. cit.*, 41-42.

<sup>15</sup> de la Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

<sup>16</sup> "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions," in **History of Religions**, Ed. M. Eliade and H. Kitagawa (Chicago, 1959), p. 142 ff.

<sup>17</sup> Cesar Majul, **Muslims in the Philippines**, pp. 109-110.

<sup>18</sup> Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 166-169.

<sup>19</sup> Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-152.

<sup>20</sup> Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-155; Cf. Majul, **Muslims in the Philippines** p. 111.

<sup>21</sup> Majul, *loc. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Majul, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>24</sup> Majul, **Pacification of Mindanao**, p. 287; also cited by Majul, in **Muslims in the Philippines** p. 115.

<sup>25</sup> Majul, **Muslims in the Philippines**, p. 116.

<sup>26</sup> de la Costa, **The Jesuits in the Philippines**, p. 301.

<sup>27</sup> de la Costa, p. 303.

<sup>28</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 305 ff.

<sup>29</sup> *op. cit.* p. 307 ff.

<sup>30</sup> *op. cit.*, esp. Chap. XIII, passim.

<sup>31</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 312.

<sup>32</sup> Blair and Robertson, Vol 27, p. 215 ff.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Blair and Robertson, Vol. 27, pp. 215-226.

<sup>35</sup> *op. cit.*, Vol. 24, pp. 258-259.

<sup>36</sup> *op. cit.*, Vol. 27, p. 316

<sup>37</sup> de la Costa, **Jesuits in the Philippines** p. 443.

<sup>38</sup> Blair and Robertson, Vol. 41, p. 106.

<sup>39</sup> de la Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 449.

<sup>40</sup> de la Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

<sup>41</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 66, n. 27.