

# ***The Government's Peace Initiatives for the Bangsa Moro: Conflict Resolution or Conflict Regulation?***

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***P***olitical science as a discipline, must assist in addressing societal problems and needs. And one area where the field can make significant contributions is state-ethnic conflict, a problem that now confronts many countries in the various regions of the world.

One of the serious problems confronting us in the Philippines is the Moro armed struggle for autonomy or secession. I view this problem as the most serious security threat to the country and, as such, requires immediate final settlement or resolution. Philippine political science should contribute to the efforts to find an appropriate formula to resolve this conflict.

This paper is designed as a modest contribution towards this need. It evaluates the government's responses to the Moro struggle in terms of their efficacy and responsiveness as conflict resolution initiatives.

This paper is divided into six parts. Part II provides a brief discussion of the emergence or beginning of the struggle, while Part III discusses what I consider to be the basic element of the Moro problem that caused the armed struggle (its symptom). Part IV discusses the Marcos and Aquino administrations' efforts to solve the conflict, while Part V discusses the Ramos Administration's peace process

for the Bangsa Moro, its status, problems and inadequacies. Part VI offers some concluding statements concerning the peace process and its future.

### **The Emergence of the Armed Struggle**

Some scholars trace the beginning of the contemporary Moro struggle to the so-called Marawi uprising in October 1972, barely a month after the declaration of Martial Law by the late President Ferdinand Marcos. In this initial salvo, Moro mujahideens attacked the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary (Camp Amai Pak-Pak, formerly Camp Kiethley) in Marawi City and the PC detachment in Saguwaran, and occupied the radio station within MSU campus in Marawi. This uprising was followed by Moro attacks against military camps in several parts of Mindanao and Sulu. These Moro attacks and the counterattacks by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) transformed the various parts of Muslim Mindanao (including Sulu) into war zones up to the middle part of the seventies, considered the peak of this war.

This war which was viewed by two foreign analysts as "Marcos' hidden war"<sup>1</sup> was gory, brutal and costly. Among its costs since it began in October, 1972 include an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 persons killed; more than one million persons rendered homeless and destitute; and the reported 200,000 to 300,000 Muslim refugees now in Sabah, Malaysia who fled their localities at the height of the conflict in the mid-1970s.<sup>2</sup> Another indicator of the severity of the conflict is the fact that during the mid-1970s, it was reported that about 80 percent of AFP's combat strength was concentrated in Mindanao and Sulu.<sup>3</sup> The late President Marcos was reported to have said that about 10,000 to 11,000 Philippine soldiers were killed in the first eight years of the war. It was also reported that the PMA Batch 1974 was almost wiped out on Mindanao during the height of the war.

These data led me to believe that the mid-1970s phase of the war was the country's severest military challenge since 1964. And I still believe that the Moro armed struggle, despite its recent factionalization into at least three groups (Abu Sayyaf is not one of them), remains the most serious security threat to the country.

The Moro armed struggle has its roots in the past. Among its historical roots are the forcible incorporation of Moroland into the Philippine state system beginning in the first decade of this century (America's military might played a major role in this episode); the introduction of capitalistic land laws; the government-subsidized/financed settlements projects (many of which were concentrated in the centers of Muslim population on Mindanao, like the old undivided provinces of Cotabato and Lanao); the largescale voluntary migration of

Christians to the Muslim areas that was stimulated by settlement projects, and the military pacification of the Moros; the indioization of public administration in Moroland as Christian Filipinos (Indios) started holding the reins of political power in the Philippine Islands; the assimilationist inroads on Moro culture; and other factors which, in their totality, led to the acute economic marginalization and destitution of the Moros and their numerical minoritization in their homeland, which became evident beginning in the sixties.<sup>4</sup>

Compounding these historical factors were events in the immediate past, which I view to be the triggering factors of the Moro rebellion. These include the Jabidah massacre in 1968; the Ilaga-AFP atrocities in the Muslim communities in mainland Mindanao (from 1970- June, 1972, barely three months before the declaration of Martial Law in September 1972), which gave the Muslims the impression (which I think was intended) that there was a plan to exterminate Islam in the Philippines; and finally, Marcos' declaration of Martial Law.<sup>5</sup> I still stick to the observation I made in my Ph.D. dissertation (University of Hawaii, 1990) that the two-year Ilaga-military atrocities in Muslim Mindanao were a part of Marcos' plan to declare Martial Law.

Because of the severity of the Moro armed struggle and its internationalization and because leaders of some Muslim countries (after sending fact-finding teams) got increasingly concerned with the sordid plight of the Philippines' small Muslim community, the Marcos regime started negotiating with the Moros for a nonviolent political settlement of the conflict which culminated in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, the same covenant which the Moro mujahideens, the OIC and the great majority of the Moro population are still anxious to see implemented.

### **The Moro Problem: Basic Elements**

It should be noted that the Moro armed struggle is not the problem, but a symptom of what I consider the Moro problem, i.e., the totality of conditions that led the Moros to resort to armed rebellion against the Philippine government.

I have identified six major themes of contemporary Moro grievances which constitute the Moro problem. The first is *economic marginalization and destitution*. The Moro communities continue to be mired in a scandalously low level of poverty which is attributable to their continuing exclusion from the economy of Mindanao. Until now, the great majority of the Moros neither participate in the key sectors of the economy of Mindanao, nor benefit significantly therefrom. This suggests that Mindanao as a "land of promise" remains as such a promise not for the Moros, but

for others.

One factor that contributed to the sordid economic predicament of the Moros is their having driven out of the choicest parts of Mindanao (like the trade significant coastal areas), a result of the aggressive wars launched against them by the Spaniards and the Americans. A second factor is their lack of means for economic participation in those areas, such as lands. A great number of Moros were dispossessed of their lands (the only basis of subsistence to many of them) as a result of the implementation of several land laws and the establishment of numerous land settlement projects in their areas before and after Philippine independence. There were also many Moros who lost their lands to rich and well-connected landgrabbers who took part in the profitable plantation agriculture on Mindanao.

The second theme of Moro grievances is their *political domination and inferiorization*. From the first decade of this century up to the present, the Moros continue to be deprived of substantive participation in the governance of their affairs. In general, outsiders were the ones making and implementing major policies for them and their communities. In the first two decades of this century the Americans took exclusive control of the governance of Moroland. This was followed by some form of double colonization. Until the Commonwealth period, Americans and Indios shared the governance of Moroland. Since Philippine Independence in 1946, Christian Filipinos have been in control of public governance in Moroland. This exclusion of the Moros from the key aspects of public governance in their homeland (especially in the first six decades of this century) is a principal explanation for their continuing economic marginalization and destitution. Their political exclusion paved the way for the plunder of their homeland's resources by others.

It should be noted that it was only in 1957 that the Muslims started electing the governors of their provinces. Before this year Americans and Christian Filipinos were appointed as governors of Muslim provinces. The only exception of this was the appointment by the late President Manuel Roxas of Muslims as governors of the Muslim provinces of Cotabato (comprising the present provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, North Cotabato and Sarangani), Lanao (comprising the present provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte), and Sulu (comprising the present provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) in 1946, understandably as a token of the national government's gratitude for the commendable resistance efforts of the Moros against the Japanese during World War II. But the late President Ramon Magsaysay brought the situation back to where it was before by appointing Christian Filipinos as governors in these Muslim provinces in 1953.

This political domination and inferiorization of the Moros continues up to

the present, despite some positive policy responses and reforms initiated by the government. While the Moros now have Muslims as governors of their presently small provinces (taken from their previously dominated large provinces), the Moros and their communities remain subject to the rigidities and constraints imposed by the unitary politico-administrative setup in the country. Central government needs and priorities remains supreme vis-a-vis the development imperatives of Muslim Mindanao.

Related to this political dilemma of the Moros is their complaint of being under-represented in some key policy making organs of the national government and the discrimination against them in the civilian and military bureaucracies. Another related factor is their continually shrinking local political space, as more areas (the sites of many government subsidized settlement projects) were carved out of their traditional strongholds. Examples are the now predominantly Christian provinces of North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Sarangani which were taken from the old Cotabato province.

The third theme of Moro grievance is the *preservation of their identity*. One major aspect of this identity is their cherished faith, Islam, which they perceived to be under siege or threat of liquidation. The Martial Law-related Ilaga-Military atrocities in Mindanao in the early seventies which were given religious color to provoke the Moros to give a big fight to the Marcos regime aggravated Moro resentment over the insults against their religion that they saw in some government policies, in some textbooks, in the press, and in their interactions with some Christian Filipinos who continue to harbor prejudices against them.

Related to the element of the Moros' identity is their desire to live Islam to the maximum extent possible. For example, as Muslims, the Moros wanted *Shariah* or Islamic law to govern their relations, instead of the Philippine legal system that contains many unislamic elements. The recent establishment of shariah courts does not satisfy this need because the jurisdiction of these courts is limited to persons, family and property relations. But even in this limited jurisdiction, the shariah courts do not enjoy autonomy since they are under the control of the Supreme Court.

Another aspect of the identity of the Moros that concerns them is the non-recognition of their significant historical contributions to the country. The centuries of tenacious resistance of the Moros against imperialism remains suppressed in Philippine history books. In national symbols, the Moros are a non-entity. For example, in the Philippine flag, there are eight rays of the sun to represent the eight Christian areas that fought against the Spaniards. According to former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, this is ironic because the Moros who were never conquered by the Spaniards for more than three centuries are not represented.

The fourth theme of Moro grievance is *their general feeling of physical insecurity* (individually and collectively). The Ilaga and military atrocities in Muslim Mindanao from mid-1970 to mid-1972 that involved the mass killing of Muslim civilians, the barbarism that accompanied the killings (like carving out of ears of male victims and slashing of nipples of female victims), and the burning of their homes, crops, mosques, and madrasahs were largely responsible for the development of this feeling among Moros (mujahideens and non-mujahideens) in Mindanao. And the brutalities and abuses that had accompanied some overkill search-and-destroy military operations in the last two or more decades have contributed to the loss of faith in AFP among the great majority of the Moros today.

Until now, the Moros' feeling of physical insecurity continues. This is the reason why even the Moros who are not in any way involved in the armed struggle do not like the mujahideens to surrender or give up their armed struggle. This is also one major reason why the Ramos Administration's "Operation Paglalansag" failed in Muslim Mindanao. This is also the reason why the creation of a Moro regional security force has become a major demand not only of the mujahideens but also of the non-mujahideens. Because of the Moros' traumatic experience with the AFP, there is no way to convince them that the AFP is their armed forces group to protect them.

The fifth theme is the *Moros' perception that the government is responsible or the party to be blame for much of their sufferings and insecurities*. This may be attributed to their expectation of the government to protect their interests (like their prior rights to some of Mindanao's lands), and the failure of the government to play that role. In not a few instances, they saw certain units or agencies of government not only as neglecting or discriminating against them, but as direct doers of certain injustices against them and their communities. This and other sentiments are reflected in the following statements made by one mujahideen. He stated:

In spite of the different system of government introduced to the Muslim areas the Muslims respected it, hoping that they would be given a new deal by their Christian Filipino brothers who now controlled the system of government. However, later events proved that the Muslims' hopes were in vain.<sup>6</sup>

He added:

How can the Moros thrive to live in a country where they are regarded as second-class citizens, where their opportunities for self-rule are curtailed, where they are deprived of the glories of heroism against foreign oppression in its history, where they are

pictured in the most brutal and dirtiest image one can ever imagine and conceive of, where they seem to be dreamless and hopeless for future prosperity in their culture and faith? How can they continue to exist with a government that gives way to its people to grab the lands of the Moros, massacre their men, rape and insult their women, kill their children, steal their properties, put their honor and freedom at stake, and burn their mosques and madrasahs?<sup>7</sup>

The great majority of the Moros (mujahideens and non-mujahideens) view the government as largely responsible for their economic marginalization and destitution; their political inferiorization and incapacity; the inroads on their destiny; and the threats to their physical security. This explains why the activities of the mujahideens are directed against symbols of government authority, not the Christian population in Mindanao. As pointed out by one mujahideen commander,

We are not against the Christians, but against the oppressive government which considers us as second-class citizens, massacred our men, women and children and destroyed our mosques and Qur'an.<sup>8</sup>

The sixth theme is the *Moros' perception of the hopelessness of their condition under the existing political and economic order on Mindanao*. The Moros see their future under the existing setup in the country's "land of promise" to be not only without promise, but gloomy. To many of them, unless some appropriate changes are made, their currently deplorable situation may intensify further as time goes on.

Related to this theme is the Moros' perception of the continuing insincerity of the Philippine government in its efforts toward them. This perception is shared not only by the mujahideens and the Moro masses in general, but also by many Muslim leaders who have worked with the government and those who are currently in the government service. The government is viewed as insincere with its special agencies for Muslim welfare, and its so-called efforts to resolve the war in Mindanao, particularly the national government's (under Marcos and Aquino administrations) commitments and pronouncements to grant genuine autonomy to Muslim Mindanao.

This perception of the continuing insincerity of the national government is a major explanation why until now many Moros do not identify with the government, i.e., they do not feel that the Philippine government is their own government. This implies a total failure of the Philippine government in its relations

to the Moros for the past nine decades. In 1903, Najeeb Saleeby, an academic technocrat of the American regime in Mindanao, stated that "the Moros do not consider themselves Filipinos." After about seven decades, the situation was the same. In 1970, the Filipinas Foundation found the same feeling when about 10 percent of the Muslims surveyed about their nationality agreed that they were not Filipinos.<sup>9</sup> Only 29.1 percent of the respondents viewed themselves as Filipinos. The same feeling was found by Abdulsiddik Abbahil in his study in 1984 that reported that only 19 (3.8%) of the 500 Maguindanaon, Maranao, Sama and Tausug college students surveyed chose Filipino as their primary citizenship identification.<sup>10</sup> And the proceedings of the recent consultations made by MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari in the South suggest that the same feeling is shared by the various sectors of the Moro society, including the youth, religious leaders and intellectuals.

### **Marcos and Aquino's Efforts to Solve the Conflict**

Since the inception of the Moro struggle, the approach of the Philippine government remains the carrot and stick variety. But the stick aspect - the use of the state's superior instruments of violence - is certainly given more emphasis. However, the Philippine experience in the past 25 years demonstrates the inefficacy of the military approach that erroneously views the armed struggle and the mujahideens as the problem, not the conditions that brought them to existence. It has become increasingly obvious that the government's continued use of its military might has only sustained and intensified the armed struggle. It has only provided that armed struggle with substantial centripetal force. More Moros (including women) have been pushed to the struggle by the government's largescale militarization and militarism in the Muslim areas on Mindanao.

Complementing the military approach are non-military efforts (carrot aspect) designed to appeal to and entice mujahideens (especially their leaders) and their sympathizers. These include the grant of amnesty to Moro "rebels" who returned to the fold of law, the pampering of a few of the leader-returnees through offers of post (mostly nominal and ad hoc) in the government and some business opportunities, like logging concessions and funds for livelihood projects. Some so-called special agencies were created not only to create the impression that the Muslim welfare is being attended to, but also as additional mechanisms to coopt some of the leaders of the mujahideens. Occasionally, some grandiose "programs for Muslim Mindanao" were announced.

Another carrot component is the government's "peace-making" efforts. The Marcos regime succeeded in coming up with the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 which it never intended to honor and implement as confirmed by future events.

Under the Aquino administration, the government came up with some general provisions in the new Philippine Constitution for the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao (also for the Cordilleras in Luzon). The government also created the Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) that prepared a draft organic act that the Philippine Congress virtually mangled.<sup>11</sup> Finally, in August 1989, President Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) prepared by Congress and for which a plebiscite was held on November 19, 1989. Like her predecessor, President Aquino failed to deliver the promise offered by her peace-making efforts. A closer analysis of R.A. 6734 her administration viewed as the government's "blueprint for peace and development" on Mindanao will reveal its unresponsiveness to the core elements of the Moro problem.

In general, the non-military efforts of the government concerning the Moros and their struggle remain largely insincere gestures designed for propaganda purposes. Some were negative counterinsurgency measures that rest on the wrong assumption that "greed for power" among the Muslim leaders and leadership-aspirant is the principal cause for the struggle.

The Philippine government (under Marcos and Aquino) failed to end the Moro armed struggle because its responses evaded the Moro problem. The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) established pursuant to RA 6734, does not have the kind of autonomy that is required to solve the problem. It does not have the capability to effectively address the discussed basic elements of the Moro problem. In other words, RA 6734 failed to function as a "real blueprint of peace and development for Muslim Mindanao" as envisioned by its framers. Like other peace initiatives of the government in the past, RA 6734's principal accomplishment is the regulation of the conflict, not its solution.

### **Ramos Administration's Peace Process**

The Moros received with optimism the advent of the Ramos administration, particularly in relation to the Moro problem. The administration's twin goals of peace and development are commendable. Like their Christian brothers and sisters, the Moros are excited with Pres. Ramos' development initiatives, like his vision of Philippine 2000 and the BIMP-EAGA scheme that takes Mindanao as its core area, and involves the neighboring Muslim countries of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei as key partners. Most importantly, the Moros appreciated president Ramos' initiation of the current peace process with the MNLF, which is expected to culminated in the scheduled meeting of GRP and MNLF panels in Indonesia next month.

The Moros have strong reason to be optimistic. many of them believe that President Ramos can provide the strong political leadership required to solve the Moro problem, which the government played an important role in creating in the first place, and which the government has now the inherent obligation to effectively address. Another reason is their awareness of the cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the government of Indonesia. The involvement of OIC (Indonesia is one of its prime movers) is helpful to the peace process, considering its persistent advocacy of a nonviolent political settlement of the conflict and its strong opposition to the secessionist alternative.

Based on the reports about the progress of the peace progress, the GRP and MNLF panels have completed 75 percent of their agenda. What remains to be negotiated are subjects which are deemed to be the most contentious. These are the MNLF's proposal to establish a provisional government to take care of the transition period; the territorial coverage of the new regional government, with the MNLF's unrelenting position on the 13 provinces and 9 cities defined in the Tripoli Agreement; and the government's requirement to subject the new arrangement to be enacted into law by the Congress to a plebiscite, as required in the Constitution.

The first two issues are linked to the third. The government is insisting that the determination of the areas to be included and the establishment of a provisional government should be settled in the required plebiscite to be conducted in the 13 provinces and 9 cities envisioned to be covered in the regional government under the Tripoli Agreement.

For the on-going peace process to succeed, the following bottlenecks must be addressed. First is the national government's uncompromising emphasis on the constitutional process, like the plebiscite. Chairman Misuari refers to it as legal technicalities which should be subordinated to the need for peace in the South, which he referred to as the substance of the on-going peace process.

But I think the government needs to find a legal way out of this dilemma. Misuari's insistence on giving paramount importance to substance over legal technicalities is not improper. His position stands on a solid theoretical foundation. John Burton, a prominent authority on conflict resolution, predicts violence when the needs of identity, participation, recognition, control and distributive justice of an individual or group are violated, or when they are deprived of the opportunity and the capability to satisfy such needs.<sup>12</sup> Being fundamental to human existence, these needs cannot be eliminated by repression, threat, and coercion. He pointed out also that efforts to solve state-ethnic conflicts fail because governments consider their constitutions, statutes, structures, and processes as uncompromisable "givens" to

which the needs of individuals and groups must be attuned or adjusted, instead of the other way around. My data on why the Moros resorted to armed struggle and why they continue to do so until now confirms this theory. They also suggest the responsiveness of regional autonomy as an approach to the Mindanao conflict.

A second major bottleneck is the series of terrorist activities or incidents being attributed to the Abu Sayyaf and other extremist Muslim groups. These activities/incidents that happened mostly in the areas outside the jurisdiction of ARMM, but included in the 13 provinces (e.g., Basilan and Zamboanga provinces) identified in the Tripoli Agreement include kidnapping, bombing, and killing of Christian civilians. The most recent and barbaric was the April 4 raid of Ipil, Zambaonga del Sur which was reported to be the work of Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Command Council and MNLF lost command. I consider this extremist activities as a major impedance to the peace process because they work against the acceptance of autonomy by the Christian and lumad residents in the 13 provinces.

A third bottleneck is the apparently negative attitude of many congressmen (including some senators) to the on-going peace process.<sup>13</sup> For example, it was reported that 49 congressmen from Mindanao committed to fight against the MNLF's proposal to establish a provisional government for the 13 provinces which is expected to be operational when the term of incumbent officials of ARMM expire in March, 1996.

Illustrative of this negative attitude is the comment of Rep. Maria Clara Lobregat of Zamboanga City that the provisional government demanded by the MNLF is "just a waste of taxpayers money,"<sup>14</sup> adding that "we have a government [the ARMM] already in place."<sup>15</sup> and apparently expecting a stalemate in the on-going peace process, Senator Ernesto Herrera suggested that the government should prepare for the possible collapse of the talks by modernizing the armed forces.<sup>16</sup> He stated that "you cannot negotiate for peace there [referring to Muslim Mindanao] with a smile."<sup>17</sup> He added that "the AFP must accelerate its modernization program and must show the separatist movement that the military has superior capability to fight with them if this will result in a violent war."<sup>18</sup>

With the demonstrated strong opposition by many congressmen and senators to any expanded autonomy package for the Moro struggle, it is hard to imagine a smooth passage of the needed new legislation in the 10th Philippine congress.

### **Concluding Statements**

The discussions in the preceding sections suggest that a paradigm shift is necessary in the government's effort to solve the Mindanao conflict. This shift

includes the need for the government to focus its conflict resolution efforts to the Moro problem, not on its symptom - the armed struggle.

A second element of the required shift is the need for the government to give more importance to nonviolent initiatives to solve the conflict and to continue treading on the supreme path of peace. It was demonstrated in the past two or more decades that the "military might approach" is not an effective method of resolving the Mindanao conflict.

A third element is to accept the view that the regional autonomy formula is to be pursued not only because the Moros (mujahideens and non-mujahideens) are demanding it, but also because it is the most responsive arrangement. It is not only the only nonviolent alternative to the conflict, but the only alternative to the threat of secession and large-scale war now hovering in Mindanao's horizon. It is the only alternative that offers much promise in our efforts to achieve the government's twin goals of peace and development.

Along this line, there is a need to correct the impression being created by some conservative elements that equates autonomy for the 13 provinces with secession or dismemberment of the country. It should be noted that the autonomy that is being demanded by the Moros requires the establishment of a regional government for Muslim Mindanao with a capability that approximates the powers of the state in a federal setup. In other words, Muslim Mindanao will still remain an inextricable part of the Republic of the Philippines. This is the setup in some developed federal states like U.S.A. and Malaysia.

A fourth element is the need to correct the wrong notion that creating a regional government for the 13 provinces and 9 cities is tantamount to subjecting the Christian residents to Moro oppression. I think the MNLF's proposal for the appointment of three deputy chief ministers (one each for the Moro, Christian and Highlander/Lumad sectors) and the plan to have two sets of courts (i.e., the shariah courts for the Muslims and the civil courts for non-Muslims) suggests that the Moros are not unmindful of the well-being of the other inhabitants of Muslim Mindanao.<sup>19</sup> They simply want a politico-administrative arrangement where they are given the opportunity and the capability to ensure their economic, political, cultural and physical survival as a community.

Finally, there is a need to emphasize the unity of nonviolent political settlement of the conflict and economic development efforts on Mindanao. The success of economic development programs in the whole of Mindanao hinges much on the success of the on-going peace process. In other words, the operationalization of a responsive regional autonomy for Muslim Mindanao will play a major role in

the efforts to realize the government's development agenda for Mindanao and the entire country.

Now is the time for this shift to be operationalized. I hope and pray that the Ramos administration's peace process is a serious beginning of genuine conflict resolution for the bangsa Moro, not another round of conflict regulation whose feasibility has a time dimension.

## NOTES

1. Fred Poole and Max Vanzi, *Revolution in the Philippines: The United States in a Hall of Cracked Mirrors* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984), 189-207.
2. The number of Muslim Filipinos killed was reported to be more than 60,000. See "Manifesto of the Muslims of the Philippines Supporting the Call for National Reconciliation and Unity," October 7, 1983, in *Dansalan Quarterly* 5, No. 1 (October 1983): 46-48.
3. The late Benigno Aquino, Jr. reported that during the mid-seventies at the height of the campaign against the MNLF the government mobilized 60 mobile battalions spending some \$4 million a day. See his testimony at the hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1983.
4. For some details on the historical roots of the Moro armed struggle, see Macapado A. Muslim, *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative* (Marawi City: OP and CPA, MSU, 1994), 47-88.
5. For some details on the contemporary causes of the Moro armed struggle, see Muslim, 89-109.
6. Dimatingcal Moro, "The Moro Struggle: An Overview," Lanao del Sur, no date, handwritten, 4.
7. *Ibid.*, 4-5.
8. Interview with Ustadz Abdul Asis Mimbantas, Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in *Dispatch*, Second Week/July 1085, 4.

9. Filipinas Foundation, *An Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs* (Manila: Filipinas Foundation, 1971), 116.

10. Abdulsiddik A. Abbahil, "The Bangsa Moro: Their Self-Image and Inter-group Ethnic Attitudes," *Dansalan Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (July 1984): 216.

11. See the book of former RCC commissioners Taha Basman, Mama Lalanto and Nagasura Madale, *Autonomy for Muslim Mindanao: The RCC Untold Story* (Manila: B-lal Publishers, 1989).

12. John Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism and War* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979).

13. Carolyn O. Arguillas, "Plebiscite 'Dilemma': MNLF Leaders Urge Ramos to Declare Provisional Government," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 25 July 1995, 1 and 7.

14. *Ibid.*, 1.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Rolly A. San Juan, et.al., "MNLF Warns of War," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 8 July 1995, 1 and 9.

17. *Ibid.*, 9.

18. *Ibid.*

19. See the "MNLF Official Position Paper," prepared by the MNLF Support Committee for the on-going peace process.