

SINO-MALAY RELATIONS IN MALAYSIA

Mavis C. Puthucheary

The Chinese in Malaysia form the second largest ethnic group in the country. What is perhaps even more significant is that they are not very much different in size from the largest group, the Malays. In fact there is no single ethnic group which forms a statistical majority in the country. The Malays form 47% of the population compared with the Chinese who form 34%. But though no single group constitutes a statistical majority in the population as a whole, there are concentrations of ethnic groups in certain areas. For example, the Malays are concentrated in the rural agricultural areas in the north and east coast of Peninsula Malaysia while the Chinese are concentrated in the urban commercial areas along the western coast. Only 15% of the Malays live in the urban areas while 46.3% of the Chinese live in the urban areas.¹ The numerical strength of the Chinese is reinforced by its economic strength. A recent study has shown that about 90% of households with monthly income below \$100 and 76.2% of households with income between \$100-200 were to be found in the rural areas. Thus, 82.6% of the households in Peninsula Malaysia with incomes below \$200 were located in the rural areas which are primarily Malay.²

Studies of Sino-Malay relations in post-Independent Malaysia have shown that the struggle for economic power by the Malays is matched by the struggle for political power by the Chinese. The almost monolithic concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the different ethnic groups is largely the result of British colonial policy which, while recognising the political hegemony of the Malays vis-a-vis the immigrant Chinese and Indian communities, allowed free access of the immigrant groups to the country and provided the ad-

Mavis C. Puthucheary, Ph.D, is a professor in the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.

ministrative infrastructure for economic development to take place based on a free enterprise economy.

British colonial policy towards the Chinese was both vague and schizophrenic. In the Malay state of Peninsula Malaysia where British rule was indirect and the sovereignty of the Malay sultans was maintained, at least in form if not in reality, the Chinese were regarded as temporary sojourners in the country. They were allowed to maintain their own clan associations and school system. Except for some control exercised by the British Protector of Chinese, they were left more or less to themselves. Even when it was clear that the Chinese population was becoming a more settled one as the sex ratio improved and more children were born in Malaya, little was done to include the local-born Chinese in the political and social life of the country. They were not accorded the status of British subjects nor given greater privileges than the more recent immigrants from China. But in the Colony of the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, British policy towards the Chinese was much more accommodating.

Those born in the Straits Settlements were considered British subjects and were given some political rights and privileges. The Chinese born in the Straits Settlements were eligible to be nominated to certain boards and councils, to enter the elitist Straits Settlements Civil Service, and were eligible to become Queen's scholars. The number of Chinese born in Malaya, as a percentage of the total Chinese population between 1931 and 1947, is shown below.

	Number born in Malaya	Chinese Population	(%)
1931	338,172	1,284,888	29.9
1947	1,196,089	1,884,534	63.5

Source: Census Report on Population 1947, pp. 40 and 84
(figures exclude Singapore).

As demands for equal treatment with Malays by locally-born Chinese were voiced both in the Straits Settlements Legislative Council

and in the Federal Council, greater demands were also made by the Malays for restrictive immigration measures to arrest the influx of Chinese and Indians. Finally the Alien's Ordinance of 1933 was passed to regulate the immigration of aliens, primarily Chinese, to the country.

The special position of the Malays vis-a-vis the other communities was a fundamental philosophy of the British colonial rule in the Malay states. Despite the demands by the other communities for equal treatment with the Malays, the British insisted that the position of the Malays was special and unique. The British had a moral responsibility to uphold the position of the rulers and the special position of the Malays. Any attempt to give more political rights to the Chinese and Indians was, therefore, seen as a breach of faith with the Malay rulers. In a speech to the Federal Council in 1927, Sir Hugh Clifford made the colonial position quite clear. He said:

These States were, when the British Government was invited by their Rulers and Chiefs to set their troubled houses in order, Muhammadan monarchies. Such they are today, and such they must continue to be. No mandate has ever been extended to us by Rajas, Chiefs, or people to vary the system of government which has existed in these territories from time immemorial . . . I feel it incumbent upon me to emphasize . . . the utter inapplicability of any form of democratic or popular government to the circumstances of these States. The adoption of any kind of government by majority would forthwith entail the complete submersion of the indigenous population, who would find themselves hopelessly out-numbered by the folk of other races; and this would produce a situation which would amount to a betrayal of trust which the Malays of these States, from the highest to the lowest, have been taught to repose in his Majesty's government.³

In contrast to this was the demand by the Chinese for equal treatment as British subjects and for the principle of *jus soli* to apply to all those born in the country. They insisted that they were not aliens but true and loyal citizens of the country who regarded Malaya as their homeland. Tan Cheng Lock, the most prominent Chinese leader during

the transitional period to Independence, attacked the pro-Malay policy of the colonial government and the ban of Chinese and Indians into the civil service as unfair and unjust, and against Queen Victoria's declaration of equality of all British subjects irrespective of race or creed.⁴

The Sino-Malay conflict of interest was dramatically brought to light when the British government suddenly stopped its pro-Malay policy after the Second World War. The proposed Malayan Union established the principle of citizenship by *jus soli*. Malay opposition to the Malayan Union was unprecedented. They opposed the Malayan Union as an attempt to deprive them of their proper place in the country and reduce them to the position of the Red Indians in North America. They pointed out that

The Chinese have China and the Indians their India. If Malays are denied their rights as the indisputable inhabitants of the country, where are they to go?⁵

The British government succumbed to Malay pressures and withdrew the Malayan Union. In its place was created the Federation of Malaya which reintroduced the special privileges of the Malays. The principle of *jus soli* was withdrawn. During the period 1947-1952, the Chinese community suffered a setback in its demands for equal treatment. But as it became clear that the British were only prepared to give Independence to the country when a *modus vivendi* with the major groups in the country was achieved, there was some attempt to include the Chinese in the political life of the country. The period 1952-1956 was a period of accommodation and compromise. The Alliance Party was formed combining the three communal parties of the United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Association. This Party got Independence for Malaya in 1957 and has been in control ever since.

Since Independence the special rights of the Malays have been a fundamental philosophy of the government and is guaranteed in the Constitution of the country. But the special privileges given to the Malays was not given at the expense of the other ethnic groups. The main issues of citizenship, language and education was settled amicably and gradually. In the case of citizenship, although the principle of *jus soli* was and still is not accepted (except for the short period between

1957 and 1962) the citizenship laws have been relaxed to make citizenship by registration fairly easy to acquire — you must be born in the country and at least one of your parents must be a Malaysian citizen. Thus, the number of Chinese who have become citizens by registration has increased enormously during the period 1955 to 1964. This is reflected in the ethnic composition of the electorate which has become more balanced in its composition.

**Ethnic Composition of the Electorate (West Malaysia)
1955-1964 (in percentages)**

	1955	1959	1964	Population
Malay	84	56	54	53
Chinese	11	36	38	35
Indian & Others	5	8	8	12

Source: K. J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaysia*, p. 187, and K. J. Ratnam & R. S. Milne, *The Malayan Parliamentary Elections of 1964*, p. 368.

With regard to the question of language, the government stated that the Malay Language shall be the national language of the country but that English shall also be an official language for ten years after Independence. The other ethnic groups, while accepting this, wanted their own languages to be recognized as official languages together with the English language. This was not accepted by the government. But although certain segments of the Chinese community regarded government policy as an attempt to deculturalize them and deprive them of opportunities to learn their mother tongue, in actual fact the policy did not cause any serious economic hardship — in fact, just the reverse. By continuing the importance of the English language the Chinese and Indians who had, during the colonial period taken full advantage of the English-medium schools established mainly in the urban areas, benefited greatly in terms of opportunities for higher education and employment. This is seen in the high proportion of non-Malays in English-

medium schools. In 1946, for example, the ethnic composition of pupils in English-medium schools was as follows:

	(%)
Malays	15.4
Chinese	52.6
Indians & Others	32.0
	100.0

Source: *Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1946, Appendix 1.*

English language was the key to upward social mobility during the colonial period and continued to play this role in post-independent Malaysia. Although the Malay language was declared the national language and Malay-medium schools were established throughout the country, the English language continued to be the medium of instruction at the University of Malaya and in governmental and business activity. Thus the government, by refusing to financially assist Chinese-medium secondary schools, in effect increased the number of Chinese in English-medium schools. The numbers of students in English-medium secondary schools increased in the first ten years of Independence as shown in the following table.

Enrolment of Pupils in Secondary Schools 1957 and 1967

Medium of Instruction	1957		1967	
	Number	%	Number	%
Malay Medium	2,315	2.2	128,625	27.8
English Medium	67,646	63.9	312,063	67.4
Chinese Medium	35,478	33.5	22,221	4.8
Tamil Medium	440	0.4	—	—
Total	105,879	100.0	462,909	100.0

Source: *Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1938-2967*, Ministry of Education, pp. 40-47.

Thus, although there were some grumbings of deprivation of cultural rights by the Chinese, the policy of allowing English to continue as the language of government gave greater opportunities for the Chinese to climb the social ladder, And thus despite the special privileges given to the Malays to encourage them to receive a higher education, the non-Malays also were able to benefit from the expansion of educational opportunities in the country. This fact is borne out in a study of the Malaysian bureaucracy where the socio-economic background of respondents were classified by ethnic group. The results were as follows:

**Socio-Economic Background of Civil Servants
by Ethnic Groups (In percentages)**

Socio-Economic Status	Malays	Chinese	Indians & Others	Total
Low	35.2	15.2	9.5	28.0
Low Medium	10.6	8.0	13.1	10.4
High Medium	22.1	24.8	39.3	25.0
High	32.1	52.0	38.1	36.6

Source: M. C. Puthuchery, *Administration, Politics and Development: A Case Study of West Malaysia*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Manchester, 1973, p. 140.

From these figures, it will be seen that there has been upward inter-generational mobility for about two-thirds of the Malays and for about one-half of the Chinese. The Malays in the lower socio-economic groups have enjoyed greater mobility than the other groups, due largely to government assistance. But the other groups have also enjoyed greater mobility. In particular those from the middle income levels have been able to send their children to universities and colleges so that they have been able to get jobs which are higher in income and status than their own positions. Thus, the overall effect has been higher inter-generational mobility for the majority of the civil servants.

But one area in which special privileges for the Malays was discriminatory against the non-Malays was in the field of government em-

ployment. In certain services a restrictive quota of non-Malays was imposed. The restriction in fact applied to only about 15% of the total higher services but it was clearly discriminatory against the non-Malays. It has therefore been the subject of endless controversy and debate. The non-Malays attack it as unfair and against the spirit of equality for all, irrespective of race. It brings in ascriptive criteria to recruitment, which should be based only on merit. On the other hand, the Malays feel that as the non-Malays are already a majority in the higher civil services (they form about 60%) the quota system is necessary to ensure some balance in representation. As the senior administrative service was always ascriptive in nature⁶ they see no reason to change it. They point out that as opportunities for non-Malays to enter the private sector are greater than for Malays, they are justified in keeping some part of the senior bureaucracy as a Malay reserve. The matter has been the subject of election speeches with the Chinese group promising to get rid of the quota system while the Malay group promise to extend Malay privileges to other services. According to the official report of the 1969 riots, this matter contributed to heightened racial tensions in the country.⁷

Since 1969, there has been considerable rethinking of government policy towards the Malays and a definite change in emphasis. The 1969 elections which preceded the riots indicated clearly that the Chinese opposition parties had been able to capture the urban Chinese votes. The Alliance Party, although winning the elections did so with reduced majority. Its losses were heavier in the urban and quasi-urban seats than in the rural seats. The opposition parties, mainly appealing to non Malay voters, actually won more of these seats than the Alliance.⁸ One opposition party, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, won sufficient seats to take over the state government of Penang, while in two other states, Selangor and Perak, the Alliance held on to control, but without having won a majority of seats.

Besides losing non-Malay votes, the Alliance Party had also lost considerable amount of Malay votes to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. By taking a middle-of-the-road policy, it had not been able to keep the support of the more extremist groups to both the Malay and non-Malay base. It was, therefore, faced with a dilemma – either to try to capture Malay extremist votes by becoming more pro-Malay or to try to capture

non-Malay extremist votes by identifying less with the Malay cause. In either choice, there was the risk of losing votes from whichever group resents the privileges given to the other group.

As the Malay section of the Alliance Party was, and still is, the strongest wing of the Alliance, it was inevitable that the Party chose the strategy of trying to win back Malay votes. This political objective was put into socio-economic terms by the establishment of the New Economic Policy enunciated by the government in its Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75.

Basically, the New Economic Policy is an attempt to restructure society so as to transfer some economic wealth to the Malay community. Malays were dissatisfied with the Alliance because it had compromised too much with the non-Malays, particularly the Chinese. It was felt that the Malay community had "lost out" in the bargain they made with the non-Malays that political power would be exchanged for economic power. The 1969 elections brought home the realization that the newly-acquired political power of the non-Malays may even be used to thwart the efforts of the pro-Malay government to help the Malays. To prevent this from happening in the future, certain measures were taken by the government. Firstly, the Constitution was amended to prevent amendments to the sections dealing with Malay privileges from their approved by the two-thirds majority as required for all sections of the Constitution. These sections of the Constitution could only be amended with the consent of the Conference of Rulers.⁹ Secondly, amendment to the Constitution and the Sedition Act made it illegal for persons to discuss the special privileges of Malays in such a manner as to promote "feelings of ill will and hostility between the different races of classes of the population of Malaysia."¹⁰ In winding up the debate on the amendment, the Deputy Prime Minister made it clear that each ethnic group must adhere strictly to its side of the bargain. He emphasized that:

- (a) a true Malaysian nation could only be born if young non-Malay Malaysians especially the Chinese accepted and honoured the pledges in the spirit and letter solemnly made which enabled the country to attain independence;

- (b) Citizenship given to the non-Malays was part of the sacrifice made by the Malays to share political rights with them;
- (c) political rights should be used by non-Malay Malaysian not to humiliate, not to arouse feelings, not to use them as a weapon to break promises solemnly made as part of the package deal. These rights should be used to help the Malays to redress the economic imbalances;
- (d) the National Language should be accepted by all without subterfuge, without the false allegation that it would kill the other languages.¹¹

He continued that "when all these are accepted by all then only a truly united Malaysian nation will be born where all will be equal because none will be more equal than others." Thus, the special rights given to Malays was seen by Malays as necessary to reduce inequalities already existing in the society and not to create inequalities between the different groups as believed by non-Malays. The intensification of measures to assist Malays tends to be seen by the non-Malays as inevitably resulting in a reduction of their economic position.

Although the government has made it clear that this will not happen as the New Economic Policy works on the philosophy of "an ever expanding economy in which the growing volume of goods and services is enjoyed by all groups in the Malaysian society in such a manner that there is no feeling of deprivation by any group, and also in a manner which contributes to national unity,"¹² there are some doubts expressed over the possibility of achieving the target of increasing Malay ownership of capital from its present negligible figure of 2% to 30% in 1990, without disrupting the distribution of the present ownership and control of wealth in the country. In actual fact, the ownership and control of the wealth of Malaysia is not in Chinese but in foreign hands. Foreign ownership is about 62% compared with Chinese ownership which is only 23%.¹³ The Chinese businessman, however, is more "visible" than the foreign entrepreneur and therefore more vulnerable

to accusations of exploitation by the Malays. Because of this, it is likely that tensions will increase should there be any serious economic hardship in the country.¹⁴

Chinese fears of discrimination against them has extended to other areas as well, particularly in the field of education. Recently, another amendment to the Constitution guarantees a student population at universities and institutions of higher learning that reflect the racial composition of the population as a whole. While the overall objective is not discriminatory in nature there is fear that there will be a decrease in the numbers of non-Malays entering universities if there are insufficient numbers of qualified Malays available. In other words, there is fear that the racial balance at universities will be maintained by reducing the student intake to the level proportionate to the number of Malays available. In particular, the English-educated non-Malays are caught in a dilemma regarding the education of their children. In 1970, a new system of education was introduced to allow for only one medium of instruction, Malay. The English language has ceased to have the same importance as it had during the colonial period and in the first ten years after Independence. The English educated non-Malays who want their children to be taught in the English-medium have to send their children to private schools with the view to sending them overseas and perhaps eventually settling down in some overseas country. However, there are many non-Malays who have accepted the present school system and therefore are sending their children to Malay-medium schools. They are afraid, however, that their children may be later discriminated against when it comes to entering universities purely on grounds of racial origin. If this happens it is likely that racial conflicts will be exacerbated.

Conclusion

The overall objective of the government is the achievement of national unity through a reduction in economic inequalities so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function. There appears, at least *prima facie*, to be a contradiction in these objectives. It is likely that in the short run the New Economic Policy will create greater communal anxieties and tensions. On one hand, there is the Chinese fear of losing their economic position and

power, while on the other hand there is the Malay fear that the Chinese will sabotage their efforts to enter the modern commercial and industrial sector. The government, in implementing the New Economic Policy, should be at least aware of the disunifying effects of some of its policies. Where the policies are necessary, even though they exacerbate communal tensions in the short run, the government should explain and try to convince the group that is adversely affected by the policies the necessity for such action. This will reduce fears and anxieties of discrimination against a particular group purely on grounds of race.

Fears of discrimination usually result in heightened communal tension and polarization of groups. The group that feels threatened attempts to safeguard its interest by joining together and consolidating their position. This was seen in Thailand in the 1939-1946 period, when, as a result of repressive measures against the Chinese language, the Chinese school system and the Chinese press, the local-born Chinese (many of whom were Thai-educated) "rallied to the support of their China-born parents and grandparents."¹⁵ In Malaysia, when there was evidence of an intensification of the government's pre-Malay policy after the 1969 riots, the Chinese community attempted to consolidate itself by forming a National Unity Movement with all Chinese-based parties. The communal problem in Malaysia was described as a stool with three legs. "If one leg continually grew weaker, the stool will tilt and if any weight was put on it, it must collapse. If we do not strengthen the Chinese, make them feel that they too have a place in the Malaysian sun, our leg will get weaker."¹⁶

As to be expected Malay reaction to the Chinese Unity Movement was negative. The UMNO Vice-President Dato Syed Nasir bin Ismail urged the leaders of the Chinese Unity Movement to "forget all racial unity movements, to avoid any political tension among the various races" and pointed out that as a result of this movement there was already a request by the Malays for a similar organization.¹⁷

Obviously if the Chinese believe that repressive measures are being taken against them they will resort not only to joining together to thwart such measures but also will resort to ingenious and devious methods to evade these measures. Thus the amount of corruption in the country increases as Chinese businessmen bribe indigenous officials,

politicians, and military personnel to assist them bypass discriminatory legislation. There is even a suggestion that legislators may introduce discriminatory bills only to get the bribes which the Chinese then offer for killing the measures.¹⁸

Discriminatory measures against a particular group in society do not contribute to national unity and may in fact create communal imbalances which require further discriminatory measures to rectify. For example, the attempt by the British government to keep the non-Malays out of senior government posts had the effect of actually forcing a larger proportion of them into business and commercial activity than would otherwise have been the case. Even now the quota system to restrict the entry of non-Malays into the administrative services has resulted in a preference among the non-Malays for courses of study at the universities that relate to science and medicine, and a preference among Malays for courses that relate to the arts and social sciences, thus perpetuating the communal imbalance in the occupational structure.

In the long run the answer to Sino-Malay conflict is in reducing the differences between the Chinese and Malays so that gradually they may become truly integrated. Despite the popular myth of the United States as a country with different and even conflicting cultures, there is a tremendous amount of homogeneity of cultures between the white communities resulting from inter-marriage and assimilation. Only the black section of the society has been alienated from the assimilation process with disastrous consequences.

In Malaysia, the Islamic religion which requires a non-Muslim to become a Muslim in order to marry a Muslim has further reduced the number of inter-marriages between Malays and Chinese. Although the Chinese have a traditional tolerance and eclecticism in religious matters¹⁹ there has been a low rate of conversion to Islam due largely to the fact that until recently there has been no distinct advantage in becoming a Muslim. So that whereas a large proportion of non-Malays including Chinese became Christians during the colonial period, there have been very few who have converted to Islam. But this has now changed and we now see evidence of mass conversion to Islam in Sabah and other states. The Malay society has been fairly open about accept-

ing non-Malays into its fold. In fact, children of parents of mixed Malay-non-Malay marriages are accepted as statutory Malays²⁰ and take Muslim names, so that in the next generation their "Chineseness" is diminished and eventually forgotten. There are also advantages in becoming a Muslim and acquiring a Muslim name for purposes of doing business and obtaining preferences in government contracts and other concessions. Thus the government pro-Malay policy may have the effect of making more Chinese and Indians become statutory Malays through inter-marriage.

This in fact may be a good thing in that it may bring about a high level of national integration. But there is little evidence both in government circles as well as within the wider political arena of this being accepted as an objective. As more Chinese become Muslims and through inter-marriage lose their identity as Chinese there is a possibility that extremist Malay groups may put some pressure on the authorities for more restrictive measures to be taken against Chinese becoming Muslims, or to make further distinctions between Malay Muslims and Chinese Muslims. Already there are signs of an Islamic revivalist movement which tends to make the religion more rigid and ritualistic than it has been in the past.

But perhaps an even greater deterrent against assimilation by inter-marriage is the communal nature of Malaysian politics which tends to emphasize the distinctions between the groups. Certainly the Chinese-based parties will not support an integration through the assimilation of the Chinese into a Malaysian society, for they will lose the very foundations of their support. Thus it is only through a non-communal political system that a truly integrated society will be brought about. In the meantime, the government should create the framework for this to take place by formulating pro-assimilation policies and rejecting these policies which have the opposite effect. The recent policy of the government to divide Malaysian citizens into "Bumiputra" and "non-Bumiputra"²¹ is an example of an anti-assimilation policy because it creates further differences among Malaysian citizens. If it is sincere in its desire to bring about national unity, the government should be on its guard against action of this kind, which exacerbates communal tensions and reduces and possibility of assimilation of the different races into a truly Malaysian society.

FOOTNOTES

1. **Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1970, Community Groups (Kuala Lumpur Jabatan Perangkaan, 1972), p. 25.**
2. **Mid-term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1973), p. 3.**
3. **"Federal Proceedings," 16 November 1927. Quoted in R. Emerson, Malaysia. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 174-175. (Rpt.)**
4. **The Royal Proclamation of 1858 states, "Our subjects of whatever Race or Creed be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the Duties of which they may be qualified their education ability and integrity, duly to discharge.' Quoted in McCallum Scott, "A New Colour Bar," The Contemporary Review, No 560, August 1912, p. 223.**
5. **Hidop Melayu. A Brief Review of the Activities of the Malay National Movement (Ipoh, 1946), p. 5.**
6. **During the colonial period the Malayan Civil Service was opened only to English "of pure European descent" and Malays. It was only in 1952 that the service was opened to non-Malays, albeit on a restrictive basis. The Malays tend to regard the quota systems as a concession they have made to the non-Malays, rather than as a restriction of non-Malays rights.**
7. **The May 13th Tragedy: A Report. The NOC, October 1969.**
8. **K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, "The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, XLIII, (Summer 1970), 204.**
9. **Constitution.**
10. **Sedition Act 1948 (revised 1969), No. 15 of 1969.**
11. **The Straits Times, 4 March 1971.**
12. **Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, p. 43.**
13. **Ibid., p. 40.**

14. For example, when there is inflation the accusation levelled against the Chinese businessman is that he is hoarding to create an unnatural supply shortage in order to make profits at the expense of the Malays.
15. G. William Skinner, "Chinese Assimilation and Thai Politics," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XVI, 2 (February 1957), 245.
16. Alex Lee speaking at the Malayan Chinese Liaison Committee for National Unity in Penang on 25 April 1971 (*Malay Mail*, 26 April 1971).
17. Dato Syed Nasir bin Ismaili speaking at the opening of UMNO's Silver Jubilees Exhibition on Saturday, 8 May 1971 (*Sunday Times*, 9 May 1971).
18. D. Stanley Eitzen, "Two Minorities: The Jews of Poland and the Chinese of the Philippines" *Ethnic Conflicts and Power: A Cross-national Perspective*. Eds. Donald E. Gelf and Russel D. Lee (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 147.
19. Skinner, *op. city.*, p. 238.
20. A Malay is defined in the Constitution as a person who professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay custom. (Article 160 of the Constitution).
21. "Bumiputra means "sons of the soil." It is used to make a distinction between Malaysian citizens. Malays and other indigenuous peoples are "bumiputra" and therefore first class citizens, compared with the Chinese and Indians whose parents or grandparents originally came from China or India.